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ABSTRACT 
This thesis concerns the governmental regulation of internationally traded goods pro-
duced by U.S. industries. To help them compete, industries seek tariffs, quotas, and other types 
of non-tariff trade barriers from the government. The United States International Trade Com-
mission plays a major role in approving and providing such restrictions. In an attempt to 
explain and better understand trade policy outcomes, I apply the capture theory model of regu-
lation most recently discussed by Becker (1983) to a study of the International Trade Commis-
sion. Whether or not an industry applies for protection, and whether or not it is granted some 
form of trade relief by the lTC may depend on a number of political and economic factors. In 
this work, I seek to predict, on a basis of domestic politics, the factors that affect the demand 
for and supply of trade protection for U.S. industries. A nested logit model is used in the final 
analysis to determine if industries use utility-maximizing behavior in deciding whether or not 
to file a petition with the lTC, that is, if industries base their decisions on their perception of 
the expected utility of getting protection. I draw two major conclusions from this work. First, 
the policy choices of the lTC do not appear to minimize deadweight loss to society which is 
the hypothesis that drives Becker's model of regulation. Second, I determine from my analysis 
that self-selection may be a problem in predicting protectionist policy outcomes; I accept the 
hypothesis that industries self-select themselves in applying for protection from the lTC. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Industries in the United States enjoy varying degrees of protection from foreign com-
petition. While economic reasons may exist to justify some of these differences in protection, 
most economists and political scientists would agree that one needs to look at the politics 
behind protective legislation to understand industry-specific differences in government assis-
tance. The purpose of this work is to try to explain the varying levels of protection across 
industries by focusing on factors that affect both the supply of and demand for the regulation of 
trade. What circumstances lead industries to request protection, and what factors affect the 
government's decision of whether or not to supply that protection? Both industries and the 
government presumably have incentives to pursue utility-maximizing courses of action. On 
the demand side, when an industry seeks a higher tariff, the benefits from that tariff presumably 
outweigh the costs of applying and lobbying for protection. On the supply side, when the 
government chooses to protect an industry, the political benefits in terms of, for example, votes 
or contributions presumably exceed the costs in terms of the lost support from those harmed by 
the policy. 
Given the above incentives of the actors, I seek to predict, on a basis of domestic poli-
tics, the factors that explain industry and government decisions on trade matters. Why, for 
example, did the electric golf cart industry get higher tariffs in 1976 when the hand tool indus-
try was turned down? In 1983, frozen orange juice makers got protection, but the canned 
mushroom industry was unsuccessful. What incentives did these industries have to apply for 
higher tariffs, and on what basis were golf carts and orange juice chosen for protection while 
hand tools and mushrooms were not? In other words, what factors best explain the actions of 
interest groups and the decisions of regulators? In pursuing answers to these questions, I hope 
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to develop not only a better understanding of how trade policy is made in the U.S. but also a 
better understanding of government regulation in general. 
Though a number of studies have recently been done on the International Trade Com-
mission, the conclusions that have been drawn in these works are questionable. One major 
problem in the literature on both the International Trade Commission and the regulation of 
trade in general has been a failure of scholars to account for both the supply and the demand 
sides of the regulatory issue. This study makes an attempt to test for the potential problem of 
industries self-selecting themselves when seeking regulation. 
This work is organized as follows. The first chapter includes both a brief history of 
trade policy in the U.S. from the imposition of the first tariff act to the present and a discussion 
of the International Trade Commission and its role in the making of trade policy. Chapter 2 
reviews the existing literature on trade regulation, particularly studies on the International 
Trade Commission. Chapter 3 explores general theories of regulation, especially examining 
the capture theories and Becker's model of pressure group competition applied to trade policy. 
In the fourth chapter, an econometric model is developed for testing several hypotheses about 
regulation in relation to the capture theories developed in Chapter 3, the data to be used are dis-
cussed, and the estimations and results are presented. Finally, I summarize the findings and 
discuss the implications of this work to the study of trade and regulation in general. 
3 
CHAPTER 1: HISTORY OF TRADE LEGISLATION AND THE ROLE OF THE lTC 
The power to regulate international trade, granted to Congress under the Constitution, 
has evolved into a complicated set of procedures involving all branches of government. In the 
18th and 19th Centuries, setting tariffs was a major activity of Congress. However, by the 20th 
Century, it was evident that Congress was moving away from any direct activities in the regu-
lation of trade. In 1934, Congress delegated the power to raise and lower tariffs to the 
President. Then by the late 1940s and early 1950s, the United States Tariff Commission (the 
International Trade Commission since 1974), which had been created in 1916 as a fact finding 
agency, acquired greater authority from Congress in the decision-making process of trade regu-
lation. The history and evolution of trade policy in the Unites States provides useful insights 
for understanding how trade is regulated today. 
History 
The history of tariffs in the United States began in July 1789 when the first tariff act 
was passed. Tariffs were introduced mainly for raising federal revenue. From 1789, through 
the early 1800's, the number of tariffs and the levels of tariffs were continuously rising with 
only occasional minor reductions. These high tariffs continued to exist through the 1800s, and 
political pressure mounted for their reduction.1 But reductions were small or nonexistent until 
the 1900's despite numerous efforts at increasing free trade. 
In 1908, President Taft campaigned with the promise to revise and lower tariffs. Once 
1. John M. Dobson, Two CenJuries ofTariffs. (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1976), pp. 8-16. 
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again, Congress undertook the task, but strong protectionist forces in the Senate managed to 
append 847 amendments which mostly increased tariffs to the House version of the tariff revi-
sion bill.2 The result was higher tariffs under the Payne-Aldrich Tariff Act of 1909 which was 
passed and signed by Taft. It was becoming apparent that Congress could not pass legislation 
to lower tariffs without succumbing to protectionist pressures. Included in this tariff rate revi-
sion bill was the "maximum-and-minimum clause" that allowed the President to add a 25% tar-
iff increase on goods from countries that were believed to use discriminatory tariffs of their 
own. A Tariff Board, or special panel of advisors, was created to assist the President in this 
decision. Three years later, this panel disbanded when Congress cancelled its appropriations 
on grounds that they were biased toward protectionism.3 
The next major event in the history of tariff legislation occurred in 1913. First the 
Underwood Tariff Act was passed cancelling the maximum-and -minimum clause and granting 
"substantial" reductions in tariffs.4 But more important was the imposition of the first income 
tax law under this act. The collection of income taxes by the federal government changed the 
fundamental nature and reason for having tariffs. Tariffs were no longer a major revenue raiser 
for the federal government. 
But in 1922, under the Fordney-McCumber Tariff Act, Congress once again raised tar-
iffs to the higher 1909 rates and delegated to the President limited power to adjust the tariff 
levels up or down by 50% under a flexible tariff provision. His power was limited in that the 
Tariff Commission was to investigate each tariff case prior to Presidential action. Then in 
2. Ibid., pp. 24-26. 
3. Ibid. 
4. Ibid., p. 27. 
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1930 due to successful logrolling politics in Congress, the Smoot-Hawley Bill was enacted 
creating the highest tariff levels in U.S. history. Smoot-Hawley was the last bill passed in 
which Congress itself established across the board tariff rate schedules. After passage of the 
1934 Trade Agreements Act, the power to raise and lower tariff rates became the task of the 
executive branch of government. 
The Tariff Commission, a regulatory agency designed to assist the President in tariff 
and trade related decisions, had been created under Woodrow Wilson in 1916. The Commis-
sion was to consist of six members with no more than three members from the same party; it 
was to be non-partisan. The Tariff Commission was created solely for information gathering. 
It was to investigate the effects of such things as customs laws, competition abroad, unfair 
trade practices, and the dumping of goods on the U.S. economy. It could respond only to 
requests made by the President or Congress, and not individual firms.5 
In 1922, the Commission was given a role in implementing U.S. trade policy. Under 
the Fordney-McCumber Tariff Act, the Commission was to recommend tariff adjustments to 
the President under the flexible tariff clause, section 313. The Commission began to hold pub-
lic hearings and anyone was now allowed to request an investigation if they had sufficient evi-
dence of harm due to imports. It also investigated unfair practices under section 316, and 
discrimination under section 317. It recommended remedies to the President in order to 
improve international trade practices. Finally, under section 315, the Commission was given 
the power to investigate tariffs to insure that rates equalized the differences in costs of produc-
tion between U.S. and foreign firms. 
5. Ibid., pp. 85-86. 
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In 1926, the Senate began an investigation into the practices of the Tariff Commission 
of the grounds that the agency was biased toward protectionism in its rulings. By 1929, thirty-
seven investigations had been completed by the agency under section 313, the flexible tariff 
provision of the 1922 tariff act. Of these thirty-seven cases, only five had resulted in tariff 
reductions while thirty-two had led to increased tariff rates. The result was a major reorganiza-
tion of the Commission, shortening the Commissioner' s terms of office and terminating all 
existing members and allowing President Hoover to recreate a "more acceptable" agency.6 The 
overall role of the agency remained basically the same as under the 1922 act. 
Recommendations under the procedure followed by the Tariff Commission, however, 
took time. Reorganization and increased funds improved operations of the Commission but 
major changes in overall tariff levels did not occur. Other countries responded to U.S. prac-
tices with higher tariffs of their own. Also, trade agreements with other nations required 
treaties which could not get past a two-thirds vote in the Senate. In 1934, under the Trade 
Agreements Act, reciprocity became the new U.S. policy tool in trade legislation. The recipro-
city provision allowed the President to negotiate trade agreements with foreign countries to 
raise or lower tariffs by as much as 50% without any Tariff Commission investigation or 
recommendation. With this act, Congress transferred even more power to the executive branch 
by eliminating the go-between role of the agency. The President was still to seek information 
and advice from the Commission but he need not wait for any recommendation. Thus the 
flexible tariff provision became obsolete since reciprocal agreements had a much larger impact 
on tariff levels. 
6. Ibid., p. 100. 
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The 1934 act granted the president three years of negotiating authority. Congress 
expanded presidential powers in 1935 by adding section 22 to the trade law, which allowed the 
President to place import fees and quotas on all agricultural goods which interfered with or had 
an effect on any U.S. agricultural programs. In 1937, Congress renewed the 1934 act and 
allowed Tariff Commissioners to take part in the negotiations. This act was extended for two 
additional three year periods in 1940 and 1943. In 1945, the act was revised to allow an addi-
tional 50% reduction in tariffs from the current levels. (Reductions had previously been based 
on 1930 levels) Besides participating in the reciprocal tariff reduction investigations, the Tariff 
Commission in this period also continued its own investigation procedures, but these functions 
became less important. By 1950, a total of 112 cost of production investigations (section 315 
of the 1922 trade act, renamed section 336 in the 1930 trade bill) had been conducted. Forty-
four resulted in increases by the President. Twenty cases resulted in tariff decreases, and seven 
cases got both some increases and some decreases. The Commission recommended no change 
in thirty-six cases and its recommendation was rejected in five cases.7 
With the creation of the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT) in 1947, the 
Tariff Commission's authority to regulate trade was revived. The GATT was a multinational 
agreement under which countries negotiated reciprocal reductions in tariffs and the elimination 
of other protectionist measures such as quotas, subsidies, and tax breaks. Written into the 
agreement was an "escape clause" which allowed any nation to withdraw from an agreement in 
case of "injury" to a domestic industry. Through congressional legislation, the Tariff Commis-
sion was given the power to investigate injury claims and report recommendations on these 
escape clause cases to the president, who had ultimate decision making authority. Escape 
7. Ibid., p. 109. 
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clause investigations soon became the major task of the agency. 
In 1948, the Trade Agreements Act came up for renewal. Congress passed a bill 
extending negotiating authority for only one year. Also in the bill was a provision forbidding 
the Tariff Commission from participating in the reciprocal trade negotiating process any 
longer. Congress ruled that the escape clause investigations were to be continued. And finally, 
a new provision was created, giving the Tariff Commission authority to determine the "peril 
point" for each article subject to tariff reductions. The Tariff Commission was required to 
study each good and determine a lower limit for the tariff below which the industry would 
suffer injury. That is, they would determine the point at which further reductions in tariff rates 
would bring peril to the U.S. industry. The president was not allowed to negotiate a tariff 
below this point without reporting to Congress. In 1949, the peril point provision was 
repealed; Congress approved a two year extension of negotiating authority for the president, 
and extended the Trade Agreements Act for three years. 
The escape clause, allowed by GATT, was first implemented by executive order in 
1947. In 1948, Congress passed an escape clause provision under section 7 of the bill, but 
proceedings were still under the executive order until 1951 . In this year, Congress passed a bill 
which spelled out to the Tariff Commissioners the exact criteria to be used in granting protec-
tion to industries. (These included such things as downward trends in production, employ-
ment, prices, profit, sales, and market share or an increase in imports of a good.) Relief options 
were suspension of trade concessions, (i.e. cancelling tariff reductions), modification of con-
cessions, withdrawal of concessions, or imposing quotas. The peril point provision was also 
reinstated in the 1951 bill and would remain in effect until 1962. 
Through the 1950s, Congress continued to renew the Trade Agreements Act giving the 
President the authority to lower tariffs, but also slowly increased the powers of the Tariff 
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Commission and Congress to oversee presidential actions. In 1953 and 1954, extensions were 
granted for one year at a time. In 1955, the act was extended for another three years. Also, 
final decision making authority in antidumping investigations was taken out of the hands of the 
Treasury Department and given to the Tariff Commission. (The Treasury Department was to 
continue its investigative proceedings but was now required to report its finding to the Tariff 
Commission.) In 1958, Congress renewed the trade agreement negotiating authority of the 
president for another four years and they assumed the power to overrule those escape clause 
decisions for which the President did not implement what the Commission had recommended. 
In 1962, Congress passed a major extension of the Trade Agreements Act. They gave 
the president a five year renewal of his negotiating authority. This also allowed another 50% 
reduction in tariffs from the 1962 levels. The peril point provision was dropped from the legis-
lation. And, the Tariff Commission was left with the authority to study the effects of trade 
concessions but could only report on "probable effects." Section 7, the Escape Clause Investi-
gations provision, was continued in basically the same form as that passed in 1951, with an 
added provision for the Commission to review escape clause relief measures to determine if the 
need for such relief had ended. Section 301 was added to give assistance to individual firms 
and groups of workers who were being injured by tariff reductions. Firms could file for loans, 
tax breaks, and technical assistance, while workers were eligible for unemployment compensa-
tion, retraining, and relocation assistance. The Tariff Commission could make recommenda-
tions to the president for granting protection to firms and workers under this provision. For 
both escape clause cases and adjustment assistance cases, the president then had sixty days to 
act on the Commissions recommendations before Congress, by majority vote, could act to 
impose the Commission's recommended solution. Finally, it was made clear that injury cases 
filed under either the Escape Clause or the Adjustment Assistance Act had to be mainly the 
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result of tariff reductions on the good to be eligible for relief (not just "due in whole or in part" 
as stated in the 1951law). 
From 1948 to 1962, there were 128 escape clause cases filed by firms with the Tariff 
Commission. But because of the stringent requirement that injury had to be based mainly on 
tariff reductions, only 23 cases were filed from 1962 to 1974. In 1974 this requirement was 
again revised; increased imports due to tariff concessions had only to be a "substantial" cause 
rather than the "major" cause of injury. In theory this would make it easier to get protection 
from the Commission through escape clause petitions. Only three cases were filed from 1972 
to 1974, compared to 31 for the three years following repeal of the tariff reductions require-
ment, 1975 to 1977. A total of 57 cases were filed for the ten years from 1975 through 1984 
(Table 1).8 
Table 1 
Escape Oause Cases 




In those years when escape clause injury relief from the lTC and the President was 
very difficult to get (1962-74), industries looked more to Congress to directly impose protec-
8. U.S. International Trade Commission Annual Reports, (Washington D.C. : U.S. Government Printing Office, 
volumes for 1948 to 1984). 
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tion. Numerous protectionist bills were introduced into Congress in these years, especially 
from 1963 to 1967 when the Kennedy Round GATT negotiations took place.9 These negotia-
tions resulted in across the board tariff cuts of 36 to 39 percent. They were carried out under 
the Trade Expansions Act of 1962 which expired shortly after the end of the Kennedy Round 
and did not get renewed, despite repeated attempts, until 1974. 
The Trade Act of 1974 was the result of several years of debate and negotiations. The 
Tariff Commission was renamed the International Trade Commission (lTC). The Commission 
was made more independent of the executive branch by placing its budget appropriations 
directly in the hands of Congress, out of control of the Office of Management and Budget.10 
Also the ITC's permanent status was cancelled, requiring it to get yearly authorization from 
Congress as well as appropriations. Trade adjustment assistance authority was transferred to 
the Department of Commerce for firms and the the Department of Labor for worker petitions. 
Injury under the escape clause no longer had to be the result of tariff reductions. Also, under 
the Trade Act of 1974, escape clause petitions can be filed by any industry spokesman, a firm, 
an individual, a union, or any group of workers. Relief is now granted to a domestic industry if 
imports have been "a substantial cause of serious injury or the threat thereof." The president 
still has the power to decide the nature and extent of relief after receiving the recommendation 
from the lTC, but Congress has the authority through a concurrent resolution to override the 
president if he does not grant the recommended relief. Initially, lTC recommendations had to 
be passed by a majority of the Commissioners to allow congressional override, but this was 
revised in 1976 to plurality rule. Antidumping proceedings continued under lTC authority, and 
9. See Dobson or the Congressional Quarterly, (Washington D.C.: CQ inc., volumes for 1963-67). 
10. Dobson, p. 125. 
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Countervailing Duty investigations were added to the tasks of the lTC. The Trade Act of 1974 
basically comprises present day trade policy and proceedings (See Appendix A for summary of 
Key Trade Legislation). 
The making of U.S. trade policy and the actors involved have changed over the years. 
The major actors have been Congress, the President, and the International Trade Commission. 
The focus of this study is on the lTC and Congress (and indirectly the executive and other 
relevant agencies). In intervening years between major trade agreements negotiated by the 
President, most changes in tariffs and quotas are decided by the lTC or Congress. The lTC 
reviews and rules on industry, firm, and worker complaints on trade matters, and Congress 
passes or threatens to pass protectionist legislation or free trade measures in response to consti-
tucnt pressures. Both bodies have played a major role in affecting trade policy in the United 
States. But by far, the vast majority of case work carried out in the area of trade in the last 
decade has been done by the lTC. The next section focuses on the role of the lTC in making 
trade policy. 
lTC Activities 
The International Trade Commission gathers data and conducts investigations in a 
number of areas. Six major statutes which involve the lTC include provisions providing for: 
General Purpose Investigations (section 332), Agricultural Adjustment Investigations (section 
22), Unfair Trade Practices Investigations (section 337), Escape Clause Investigations (section 
201), Antidumping Investigations (sections 733 and 735), and Countervailing Duty Investiga-
tions (sections 703 and 705).11 The General Purposes Investigations are basically fact finding 
11. See the U.S. International Trade Commission Annual Reports, for excerpts from the original texts and a description 
of these six slatutes. 
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studies, conducted upon official request or upon the Commission's own initiation, to aid in 
trade policy making. Agricultural Adjustment Investigations are conducted primarily to deter-
mine if agricultural goods are being imported in such quantities and under such conditions as 
to interfere with programs of the Department of Agriculture. The President requests such 
investigations and has the authority to restrict the imports in question by imposing fees or quo-
tas. Unfair Trade Practices Investigations deal largely with patent violations by foreign 
nations. (Actually, the statute states very generally that investigations are carried out to deter-
mine whether "unfair methods of competition or unfair acts are occurring in the importation of 
articles into the United States," but historically this law has dealt mostly with property rights 
cases and the violation of patents.) Petitions are filed by firms or by the lTC itself. The lTC 
has the power to exclude the articles under investigation but the president may disapprove of 
their action within 60 days and cancel their order. 
These first three investigations--general purpose, agricultural adjustment, and unfair 
practices--will not be dealt with further, since they are not direct avenues through which indus-
tries can seek protection. The latter three statutes--escape clause, antidumping, and counter-
vailing duty--do allow industries themselves to seek relief from foreign competition; thus these 
three statutes will be considered in greater detail . 
Escape Clause: 
Escape Oause proceedings began in 194 7 in response to the formation of GATT. The 
Escape Clause allowed members of GATT to withdraw from any reciprocal trade agreement 
which caused "injury" to a domestic industry. In 1951 Congress established criteria for the 
lTC to follow in determining injury; injury included such things as downward trends in pro-
duction, employment, wages, prices, profits, or sales, and increases in inventories, imports, or 
market share of foreign imports. Congress continued to expand the criteria for dealing with 
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Escape Oause injury over the years to include "all relevant economic factors." These investi-
gations and matters directly related to them took up a good deal of the Commission's time and 
resources in its early years. But the stringent injury requirement of the period from 1962 to 
1974 limited the Commission's case load in these years. In 1975, there was a resurgence of 
Escape Clause cases but the number has dwindled again in recent years. 
By statute, the lTC conducts Escape Clause investigations upon its own initiation, 
upon request of a firm, an industry representative, a group of workers, or by requests from 
Congress or the President. The lTC has six months in which to carry out its investigation to 
determine whether a particular good is being imported in such quantities as to injure or 
threaten the domestic industry. Under plurality rule, if the Commissioners vote against the peti-
tioner, no action is taken. If they vote that injury has indeed occurred, then they must make a 
recommendation for relief to the president. The president then has discretion to implement 
their recommendation, to impose his own form of relief for the industry, or to ignor the recom-
mendation for granting relief. 
Relief can be in the form of an increase in tariff duties, quantitative restrictions (quo-
tas), negotiated agreements, or adjustment assistance in loans, tax breaks, or the like to the 
petitioners. If the president's solution differs from that recommended by the Commission, 
Congress has the authority to overrule the president. From 1951 to 1983, the presidential veto 
of an lTC decision could be overturned by a simple majority vote in Congress. However, since 
the congressional veto was ruled unconstitutional in 1983, Congress now must pass a joint 
resolution (a majority vote in each House) to overturn the President's decision. This joint reso-
lution is subject to a Presidential veto which Congress can override with a two-thirds vote in 
both chambers. A number of years (as specified in the final decision) after relief has been 
imposed, the lTC conducts a follow up investigation to determine whether the elimination of 
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that relief would cause harm in the future to the industry in question (see Diagram 1). Escape 
Clause proceedings have been an important part of trade legislation since Congress began 
delegating its authority to make tariff adjustments. 
Antidumping: 
Antidumping Investigations began in the Treasury Department under the Antidumping 
Act of 1921. Dumping is the act of selling goods to a foreign country at less than their home 
market cost of production. Investigations were carried out to determine whether industries 
were being injured by these practices. In 1954, Congress gave the lTC final decision making 
power on dumping cases. The Treasury Department continued to conduct its investigations, 
but then turned its findings over to the lTC for the final decision. Then in 1979, the Commerce 
Department took over the Treasury Department's investigative role. 
Under the present law, preliminary petitions are filed with both the lTC and the 
Department of Commerce by individual firms, industry representatives, associations of firms, 
workers' groups, or unions. The filing of the petition triggers investigations in both bodies. 
The lTC has 45 days in which to make its initial decision as to whether the Commerce Depart-
ment should continue its preliminary investigation. If the lTC rules against the petitioners in 
the preliminary stage, no action is taken. If the lTC rules for the petitioners, the Commerce 
Department continues the investigation and makes its preliminary ruling within 160 days. If 
Commerce initially rules against the petitioners, then it conducts a second investigation (within 
235 days of the original filing of the petition) which either ends the case or, if it rules for the 
petitioners in this final proceeding, sends it back to the lTC for its final investigation. If Com-
merce initially rules in favor of the petitioners, then the case goes directly to the ITC for its 
fmal investigation. In the former case, the lTC has 45 days to make a decision, and in the latter 
case, the ITC has 120 days to rule on the case. A negative final decision by the ITC will end 
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the case. A positive final decision means the petitioner has won, and the Secretary of Com-
merce imposes a dumping duty equal to the amount by which foreign market value exceeds 
price on the imported good. Finally, if preliminary decisions are positive, bonds must be 
posted on imports until a final decision is reached (see Diagram 2). 
Countervailing Duty: 
The final area of investigation involving the lTC that will be dealt with here is the case 
of Countervailing Duty Investigations. A countervailing duty is a duty imposed on imported 
goods to counter subsidization which takes place in the foreign market. The lTC became 
involved in these inquiries under the Trade Act of 1974. As with the Antidumping cases, the 
Treasury Department carried investigations in conjunction with the lTC until 1979 when Com-
merce took over the Treasury Department's role. Since 1979 the procedure has been exactly 
the same as that of the Antidumping Investigations. Petitions must be filed with both the lTC 
and the Department of Commerce. Those groups who are eligible to petition are the same as 
those for dumping cases and the procedure following initiation of a case is identical to Anti-
dumping Investigations. Injury to the petitioner is granted when the lTC and Commerce rule 
that the goods under study have been subsidized in their production by the home country. If 
the case receives a positive ruling, the Secretary of Commerce imposes a duty equal to the sub-
sidy amount as determined by the lTC in its investigation. 
The goods for which industries seek protection through the lTC represent a wide 
variety of products--from clothespins and plastic animal identification tags to steel products 
and automobiles. The process is often long and seemingly costly, yet many industries and 
even small individual firms find the effort worthwhile, as is apparent from the number of yearly 
petitions. Yet how much do we or firms know about their probability of success in seeking 
protection, or the factors involved in the decisions of policy makers? The next chapter reviews 
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developments in the literature on trade and the lTC in trying to understand the regulation of 
trade in the United States. 
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CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW 
Tariff policies have been studied for decades. An extensive literature exists which 
attempts to explain historic levels of protectionism and changes in those levels over time. 
However, these studies, containing conflicting results and diverse methodologies, have left 
unanswered questions and offer results that can be challenged. 
Theories on Protectionism and Tariff Rates in the U.S. 
One of the earliest studies of tariff policies was Schattschneider's (1935) pioneering 
work, which concentrated on the 1930 Smoot-Hawley Trade Bill. His study was an attempt to 
explain tariff rates as a product of one-sided pressure politics. He claimed that the public hear-
ings on setting tariff rates were biased in favor of protectionism and that opposition was unor-
ganized and uninformed. He concludes that the upward revision of tariffs by Congress was the 
result of protectionist political influences on congressional decision making. Bauer, Poole, and 
Dexter (1963) disagreed with this notion somewhat in that they believed that interests other 
than pure rational self-interest, like attitudes toward internationalism and man's role in busi-
ness and society, are operating in the making of trade policies. 
Both of these works, however, tend to slight the institutional context of policy making. 
Schattschneider, in particular, concludes that political interest groups in society are bad 
because pressure group politics resulted in "bad" public policy. However, it may be the case 
that the upward revision of tariffs in the 1930s was a result of congressmen satisfying their own 
personal goals of reelection by granting widespread protection. By looking at the making of 
trade policy in its institutional setting, where the rules governing the actors and the goals of the 
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actors themselves are considered, perhaps we can better understand the outcomes we observe. 
Some of the earliest empirical literature on protectionism in the U.S. focused on the 
relationship between U.S. tariffs and labor intensity. It was concerned with the question of 
whether U.S. trade policies tended to protect labor in manufacturing industries. These works 
rested on the intuition of the Stolper-Samuelson Theorem (1941) that protectionism tends to 
favor the factor of production used relatively intensively by an industry. Studies, (e.g. 
Vaccara's, 1960) found evidence that tariff rates in the U.S vary positively with labor intensity. 
Based on these findings, Travis (1964) argued that the Leontief Paradox (1954)---that U.S. 
exports are more labor intensive that U.S. imports---could be explained by U.S. trade policies. 
By restricting the import of labor intensive goods from the U.S. market, one could explain the 
fmdings that U.S. import-competing industries were more capital intensive and export-
competing ones more labor intensive. Under free trade conditions, the Hecksher-Ohlin 
Theorem (1919) maintains that labor intensive imports should increase relative to capital inten-
sive imports because of the comparative advantage of the U.S. in capital intensive industries. 
So U.S. tariff policies were said to be responsible for the seemingly contradictory patterns of 
trade. 
Attempting to test the Hecksher-Ohlin Theorem, Leontief observed that the United 
States had more capital per worker than its trading partners, and therefore, it must export 
capital-intensive and import labor-intensive commodities. His empirical findings, however, 
contradicted this hypothesis. Travis then presented evidence that he believed showed that the 
tariff policies of the U.S. fit the Leontief Paradox exactly. He found in the 1960s that manufac-
tured goods which were relatively labor-intensive had the highest tariffs and that, because of 
this high degree of protection, it only appeared that U.S. imports were more capital-intensive. 
Furthermore, evidence indicated that exports were highly sensitive to reductions in tariffs, 
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which led Travis to conclude that if the excessive tariffs on labor-intensive goods were reduced 
to a reasonable level, imports would increase dramatically. 
Baldwin (1971) also argued this point stating that, if all trade regulations were 
removed, the capital intensity of import-competing industries in the U.S. would probably go 
down. However, Baldwin also stressed the simplicity of the Hecksher-Ohlin Theorem as the 
most probable reason for its apparent contradiction with observed trading patterns. He main-
tained that the nature of the labor force, technological differences, transportation costs, and 
other factors need to be included in the study of trade patterns. 
A number of studies that followed cast doubts on Vaccara 'sand Travis's findings. For 
example, Cheh (1976) and Basevi (1966) found evidence refuting the claim that the U.S. pro-
tects labor intensive industries. In particular, by considering both tariff and nontariff rates of 
protection for 1964, Cheh found no significant relationship between protection and the labor 
intensity of U.S manufacturing industries, while Basevi claimed that including the tariffs on 
the inputs of manufactured goods reversed the relation between protection and labor intensity. 
Many modem empirical studies, however, suggest that unskilled labor intensive indus-
tries in the U.S. do receive more protection (see for example Magee, 1972 or Oark, 1980). By 
dividing labor into groups of skilled and unskilled workers, they found that protectionism is 
biased toward unskilled labor intensive goods. But this has been an ongoing debate in the 
literature. 
Theories of the Supply for and Demand of Trade Regulation 
Attention turned next to industry-specific variations in levels of import protection. A 
body of work on cross-industry studies attempted to identify more general determinants of the 
regulation of trade. A majority of this literature focused on various characteristics of the 
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demand for protection or the supply of protectionist measures, or both. 
On the demand side, firms, industries, and workers, desiring to maximize their earn-
ings, seek relief from import competition through bureaucratic and legislative processes. On 
the supply side, protection is awarded by the lTC, the Commerce Department, Congress, and 
the Executive who determine by political and/or economic criteria which industries will be 
granted import relief. The following body of literature is composed of scholars ' attempts to 
predict equilibrium tariff rates with a variety of supply- and demand-side variables. 
On the demand side, Pugel and Walters (1985) attempt to predict demand for protec-
tion by examining the behavior of U.S. corporations with respect to trade policy initiatives in 
the 1970s. They hypothesize that a company will be biased toward protectionism if it faces 
pressure from import competition, does not benefit from access to foreign markets, and is 
unable to adjust to increases in import competition. Their dependent variable is company posi-
tions on trade policy issues derived from survey questions sent to the Fortune 1000 industrial 
corporations in 1980. Explanatory variables used to test the hypotheses were initial tariff rates, 
increases in import penetration, the ratio of research and development expenditures to sales, 
and an index of product diversification. Their results indicate that a firm's position on trade 
protection is significantly determined by competitive pressures. 
Potential problems with these results stem from the manner which the companies' 
positions on trade issues were determined. A sample of only 147 of the 1000 companies 
responded to the questionaire, of which only 68 were useable, creating possibilities of severe 
sample bias. Further, the information elicited by the questionnaire may be invalid due to 
interpretational differences by the firms. Firms selected a number between one and five to 
indicate their positions on various protectionist measures. But because of the nature of the 
response choices, firms may interpret the scale differently, thus distorting the information they 
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provide. 
Pincus (1975) develops a supply oriented pressure group model to test the effective-
ness of interest groups in obtaining tariffs. His dependent variable is the tariff rates set by the 
Tariff Act of 1824. For explanatory variables, he identifies a number of cross-industry factors 
that affect a group's ability to influence policy makers, namely Congress. These include a 
measure of size by industry output, their 1820 tariff rates, the number of establishments, con-
centration, proprietorial income share, sales dispersion by state, production dispersion by 
county, and number of senators with the industry in their districts. His results indicate that an 
industry's tariff rate is significantly determined by how successful the group is at producing 
political pressure. That is, success is determined by a group's costs of organization, homo-
geneity, size, and the like. 
Pincus's results, however, are not generalizable and may by overstated because he fails 
to consider the political context surrounding the making of tariff policies in the 1820s. Evi-
dence from the Congressional Debates on the tariff acts of the 1820s suggest that political 
maneuvers on the part of members of Congress and Executive policy makers resulted in higher 
tariffs being granted to industries that did not even seek such protection (see also chapter 2 of 
Taussig, 1966). Thus it is not clear that his estimations correctly predict interest group success 
in pressuring for policy outcomes. 
Caves (1976) tests three different models in an attempt to explain cross industry varia-
tions in tariff rates in Canadian manufacturing industries. One model postulates that govern-
ments act to maximize the probability of their reelection. A second postulates that government 
action reflects a collective nationalistic preference. Finally, the third, for which Caves finds the 
most support, is an interest group model in which he claims that the granting of protection is 
based on the costs and benefits faced by industries and their incentives to organize. Among the 
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explanatory variables used are industry concentration, percentage of sales made by an industry 
to other industries, growth in value of shipments, and value added per worker. Though Caves 
finds support for his pressure group model, Helleiner (1977) finds evidence that contradicts 
many of his results by imposing a different set of variables to explain the same hypotheses put 
forth by Caves. 
Godek (1985) attempts to predict the relationship between industry characteristics and 
protectionism, measured by tariff and quota restrictions on the trade of manufactured goods. 
He also postulates a pressure group model which identifies factors that influence the efficiency 
of industries in lobbying for trade protection. He uses measures of size, geographic concentra-
tion, the number of firms, and consumer expenditures to predict levels of tariffs and quotas for 
1970 and finds evidence that the nature of industries, as pressure groups, influences patterns of 
trade restrictions. 
Godek claims to explain incentives for industries to demand protection by using the 
average wage in the industry to account for the comparative advantage of the U.S. in exports 
which are capital and skilled labor-intensive. A higher average wage implies more skilled 
labor exists in the industry, which should be negatively correlated with demand for protection. 
But it is not clear that a low average wage is a good measure of demand for protection in 1970, 
and certainly this notion is not generalizable for the 1980s. With the rise of skilled labor 
industries in the Third World, wage level may not be a good indicator of U.S. industrial 
demand for protection. Further, Godek assumes that industries are free to petition, on any 
grounds, for any manner and extent of trade restrictions, and that bureaucratic and congres-
sional action has no bounds; that is, he ignores the costs to industries of demanding protection 
and the rules and institutional constraints on the supply of protection. 
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Anderson (1978 & 1980) seeks to predict the levels of rates of assistance to rural and 
manufacturing industries in Australia. His work is innovative in that he attempts to capture all 
forms of assistance to both import and non-import competing industries by identifying factors 
that affect both the supply and demand for government assistance. On the demand side, 
Anderson uses variables for labor intensity measured by average wage, lobbying pressure 
measured by number of firms, industry decline measured by change in employment, and con-
centration of output. For the supply variables, he uses number of employees in the industry, 
average wage, geographic concentration, and finally, the share of imports and exports in 
domestic sales to measure whether there is a bias toward imposing tariffs and not granting 
export subsidies. The hypothesis is that the government should be more willing to grant tariffs 
which raise revenues than offer subsidies which deplete treasury resources. He concludes from 
his regression analysis that Australian industries that are more likely to be protected are labor-
intensive, low wage, highly concentrated, high in total employment, and are not export-
oriented, though he cannot conclude from his results that import-oriented industries receive 
more protection. 
Finally, Ray (1981) develops a cross-industry model to determine levels of protection 
and tests it against tariff and nontariff barriers in the U.S. for 1975. His central thesis is that 
trade restrictions are consistent with profit maximization across industries. Ray finds that pro-
tection in the form of tariff and nontariff barriers is biased toward industries in which the U.S. 
is at a comparative disadvantage in world trade. However, he finds a discrepancy between 
other factors in explaining tariff and nontariff barriers. He concludes that tariffs are unrelated 
to concentration and geographic distribution of production facilities, while nontariff barriers 
arc most prevalent in less concentrated industries and ones in which production facilities are 
dispersed across regions of the U.S. Ray also finds that nontariff barriers are more prevalent in 
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industries that already have higher tariff rates, implying that nontariff restrictions rather that 
additional tariffs have been granted to already protected U.S. industries. 
His findings that trade barriers are greater on products in which the U.S. has a com-
parative disadvantage lends support to his hypothesis that trade restrictions are consistent with 
industry profit maximization, since there is little to gain from protecting an industry in which 
the U.S. has the advantage. Ray also uses a measure of product differentiation as a proxy for 
deadweight production and consumption costs by assuming that elasticity of demand is 
reduced by product heterogeneity. However, the expected positive correlation of trade restric-
tions and product differentiation did not bear out in his analysis. Thus his assumption that loss 
of social welfare will be minimized by governmental action on trade policy was not supported. 
The literature presented thus far, which seeks to explain levels of tariff and nontariff 
barriers to trade by exploring factors which affect the supply of and demand for regulation, 
provides much insight into the understanding of protectionism. Though not free from prob-
lems, these works provide a sound base for studying the regulation of trade in the U.S. In addi-
tion to these works, scholars have recently become interested in the International Trade Com-
mission and its role in the making of trade policy. The objective of many of the studies of the 
lTC has seemingly been to determine fluctuations in pressure and whether or not protectionist 
pressures have had an effect on U.S. policy. I will now discuss the body of literature 
specifically related to the lTC, explore a number of problems, and seek ways of improving on 
the works discussed. 
Theories of Regulation by the lTC 
Goldstein (1986) examines lTC activity to see whether the agency has become more or 
less protectionist over time. She claims that scholars have focused on the demand for 
28 
protection, and not on the supply, or the actual amount that has been imposed; she refutes the 
proposition that protectionism has been increasing in the U.S. Goldstein looks at the accep-
tance rate of lTC petitions from the 1950s to the present and concludes that it has not changed 
significantly over time. She claims from these results that policy is determined by the state's 
central decision makers and that the U.S. will become more protectionist only if their beliefs 
and attitudes change. Mere protectionist pressures, she claims, will not change the policy of 
the state. 
Though Goldstein finds that the acceptance rate of petitions for protection has not 
increased over time, it is important to point out that this does not imply that protectionist pres-
sures have not had an effect on policy makers. Perhaps the more interesting question is which 
petitions have been successful; that is, to whom have the protectionist favors been granted? 
This question will by addressed in the following chapters. 
Lenway (1985) comes to a similar conclusion as Goldstein, that pressure groups have 
little influence on trade policy. Her claim is that GATT, the General Agreement on Trade and 
Tariffs, is the constraining force for U.S. policy makers. Her work is a case study of the tex-
tile, auto, and telecommunications industries. For each industry, she looks at whether or not 
they have gotten the protection that they have sought from the lTC, Congress, and Executive 
policy makers. She measures the success of pressure groups by whether or not they get the 
protection that they seek. She concludes that policy makers evaluate claims in the context of 
the GATT and only give in to protectionist pressures and grant relief when it falls within those 
guidelines. However, there is a danger in her judging the success of pressure groups by 
measuring the difference between what they ask for and what the government is willing to 
grant. If the government responds to protectionist petitions by granting only a percentage of 
what is requested, industries will surely overstate their claims and demands which may lead to 
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a conclusion that policy makers are very much in favor of free trade despite the fact that pro-
tectionism continues to flourish in the U.S. 
Takacs (1981) tests whether the demand for protection is determined by aggregate 
economic activity in the U.S. Pressure for protection is measured by the number of Escape 
Oause petitions filed with the lTC by firms or industries between 1949 and 1979. A number of 
explanatory variables are used in her study. Aggregate economic activity is measured by the 
unemployment rate, gross national product, and capacity utilization in the U.S. The interna-
tional competitive position of the U.S. is measured by the trade balance and import market 
share. Also included as an explanatory variable is the influence of the number of prior success-
ful cases in the petition process on the demand for protection. Finally, Takacs accounts for 
legislative changes with dummy variables for the 1962 and 1974 Trade Acts. The results 
confirm Takacs' hypothesis that protectionist pressure is determined by the cyclical state of the 
economy and its competitive position vis' -a-vis' the the rest of the world. 
Takacs goes on to estimate the supply of protection using the number of successful 
petitions as the dependent variable and explanatory variables identical to those used to estimate 
the pressure for protection. Here she finds that the number of successful cases is not 
significantly related to economic activity, which she claims is evidence that the government 
does not necessarily respond to protectionist pressures. 
Though her results are significant, Takacs' work has several problems. First, she 
ignores all firm or industry specific characteristics and incentives for seeking protection from 
the lTC. Second, by measuring lTC activity only on the Escape Clause cases, excluding Coun-
tervailing Duty and Antidumping cases, she may not really be measuring demand for protec-
tion, since firms have alternative means of seeking action from the lTC. (She admits this may 
be a problem, but states that she got insignificant results by including these other types of cases 
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in her analysis.) Third, though she tries to account for legislative changes in the requirements 
for protection under the Escape Clause, she does not include both of the legislative dummies 
for the 1962 and 1974 Trade Acts in any single equation. Further, because of a high degree of 
multicollinearity among the cyclical economic variables, GNP is the only variable included in 
each of her five regressions. Thus, her analysis seems rather as hoc and incomplete. 
A more disaggregate cross-industry study on the lTC was done by Baldwin. Baldwin 
(1985) examines the political behavior of the lTC members by looking at their voting patterns 
on Escape Clause cases. He identifies economic and political variables in an attempt to explain 
lTC behavior. His dependent variable is the percentage of commissioners who found injury in 
cases filed between 1974 and 1983. His empirical results show that two variables, the ratio of 
net profits to sales and average annual percentage change in employment, are significantly 
related to these voting patterns; lower profit rates and higher unemployment in the industries 
appear to explain a significant percentage of the commissioners' affirmative votes. Also 
included in this regression were political variables such as party affiliation of commissioners, 
size of the industry, a dummy variable indicating congressional or presidential requests for the 
investigations, a dummy for geographic concentration of an industry in one or two states, and 
an industry location variable measuring the relation between an industry's location and a 
commissioner's regional professional background. None of these political or interest group 
variables were found to be significant in explaining lTC voting behavior. Baldwin concludes 
from this analysis that the lTC is not influenced by political pressures either form Congress, 
interest groups, or the President. 
Though Baldwin's analysis and conclusions appear sound, his choice of variables do 
not adequately measure political influence in its institutional framework. Given that the lTC 
acquired its powers through delegation from Congress, it may be important to consider 
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congressional influence on lTC decision making. The only such variable that Baldwin includes 
in his study is the dummy variable for congressional requests. However, out of a total of 47 
observations, the actual number of congressional requests is too small to make any conclusive 
fmdings. Secondly, industry location or concentration should be considered in relation not 
only to the commissioners' regional backgrounds, but also to those of congressmen. Assuming 
that Congress has some influence over agency behavior, it may be important to consider 
congressional factors more extensively in analyzing its political influence on lTC decision 
making. 
Furthermore, Baldwin's choice of party affiliation of commissioners as a measure of 
political influence may pose problems. Though some generalizations are sound, it is difficult, 
if not impossible, to predict voting behavior on trade legislation by party lines. Though a 
Republican from a harbor town may favor free trade because a large portion of his constituents 
work on shipping docks or related jobs, a Republican from the Pacific Northwest, whose con-
stituents consist largely of lumber workers, will probably favor protection from Canadian 
lumber trade. In general, using party affiliation to predict political positions on trade legisla-
tion may yield much poorer results than using it to predict some other types of legislation. 
Finally, Shughart and Tollison (1985) test some empirical propositions developed by 
Peltzman (1976) about the behavior of regulatory activity over the business cycle. They focus 
on the activities of three regulatory agencies, one of which is the lTC. The dependent variable 
used in their regression to explain lTC activity is the number of investigations completed each 
year by the commission from 1926 to 1981. The explanatory variables include a measure for 
business conditions (one of either real GNP, unemployment rate, business failure rate, or 
excess capacity), the annual budgetary appropriations, dummies for legislative changes, and a 
linear time trend. Pcltzman 's hypothesis predicts that producer protection will be more 
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prevalent during recessions. Shughart and Tollison conclude from their regression that this 
business cycle hypothesis does quite well in predicting lTC activity; their results support 
Peltzman's hypothesis that the lTC provides more protection during business contractions. 
Though their results appear to significantly predict lTC activity, their choice of 
measuring lTC behavior by the number of completed investigations may pose serious problems 
for the conclusions they draw. There is no good reason to assume, as they do, that the number 
of investigations conducted is an indication of the ITC's propensity to grant protection. What 
they really predict is producer demand for protection, not agency supply, which is what they 
claim to be measuring. 
The broad body of literature presented here represents a significant attempt by scholars 
to explain the regulation of trade. Many factors are identified to explain the supply of and 
demand for protection, but problems are apparent in much of the literature. There are few 
comprehensive empirical studies and frequently, it is unclear whether the authors are measur-
ing supply or demand, or some convoluted combination of the two. Secondly, the narrow 
focus of some of the studies leads to contestable conclusions. 
The studies on the lTC, in particular, draw conclusions about the supply of regulation 
by the Commission without properly accounting for industry demand. Ignoring an industry ' s 
decision of whether or not to file an application for protection may result in a self-selection 
bias in the analysis of the supply of regulation. Self-selection will be a problem if an 
industry's decision to apply (or not) is affected by its perception of the likelihood of a positive 
lTC ruling. 
In the following chapters, I draw heavily on this body of trade literature in an attempt 
to improve our understanding of protectionism. By looking at the behavior and incentives of 
both policy makers and industries, I seek to predict on a basis of domestic politics the factors 
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that best explain the supply of and demand for regulation; that is, which industries are more 
likely to seek protection and when is the lTC more likely to grant them that protection. My 
study revolves around a well known body of literature on pressure group competition for regu-
lation. In the following chapters I identify and explain a pressure group model of regulation 
and then test this model using data on lTC decisions, while accounting for the problem of self-
selection. 
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CHAPTER 3: THEORIES OF REGULATION WITH AN APPLICATION TO 
PROTECTIONISM 
Regulation of the U.S. economy has become an important and controversial aspect of 
federal governmental activity. More and more administrative agencies have the power to regu-
late prices, entry of firms into an industry, and levels of production. Such intervention can 
involve large costs and benefits, and can have important consequences for the distribution of 
wealth in society. 
Studies of regulation generally fall into three categories: 1) price and entry regulation 
of industries with competitive markets, 2) price and entry regulation of naturally monopolistic 
industries, and 3) regulation whkh deals with market failure in areas such as the environment, 
health, occupational safety, and product quality. 12 This study will focus primarily on the first 
category, industry regulation of competitive markets. 
It is generally agreed that regulation of competitive markets creates economic 
inefficiencies. Yet many competitive industries continue to face price, quantity, and entry con-
trois imposed by regulatory agencies of the government. Of particular interest in this study is 
regulation of internationally traded goods in the form of tariffs, quotas, and other types of non-
tariff barriers. Barriers have been placed on a wide variety of imported goods which are also 
produced by U.S. industries. What are the effects, on industries and society, of imposing such 
trading barriers on these goods, and what criteria are used to determine which industries will be 
protected and which will not? Munger (1983), Tarr and Morkre (1984), Magee (1972), Mintz 
(1973), and many others have estimated the costs that various forms of protectionism impose 
12. Joskow, PaulL. and Roger Noll. "Regulation in Theory and Practice: An Overview." in Studies in Public 
Regulation. ed. by Gary Fromm. (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1981), p. 3. 
35 
on society. This work will be concerned mainly with the question of which industries are more 
likely to enjoy protective trade barriers. 
It is assumed that industries seek regulation in order it increase their wealth. Barriers 
to trade not only create economic rents for the industries, but also provide revenue to the 
government which can be used to subsidize specific industries and workers being hurt by 
foreign competition. The question, then, is why are some industries protected when others are 
not? 
In exploring the answer to this question, one needs to look at the incentives of the 
actors in the regulatory process. Which factors can explain industries' incentives to seek pro-
tection and which factors explain the regulatory agency's incentives to supply that protection? 
From existing trade and regulation literature, these factors will be identified and quantified in 
order to test the power of existing theories of regulation in explaining protectionism in the U.S. 
In the broad field of competitive market regulation, two well known approaches have 
dominated the literature in recent years. The first is best known as the "capture" theory 
approach developed first by Stigler (1971 ), and further refined by others such as Peltzman 
(1976) and Becker (1983). The essence of the capture theories is that political groups compete 
amongst themselves for political influence and wealth by lobbying and applying pressure on 
the politicians or regulators. Regulators or politicians maximize their political support by 
choosing "optimum" interest groups as beneficiaries of regulatory policies. These models then 
posit a demand for and supply of regulation. 
The second approach, known as the theory of "congressional dominance," includes the 
works of Shepsle (1979), Weingast (1981, 1984), Shepsle and Weingast (1984), Weingast and 
Moran (1983), and others. The bureaucracy here is no longer captured by interest groups; 
other institutions, particularly Congress, are given more attention. The basic tenets of this set 
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of theories is that Congress controls the bureaucracy through such things as oversight commit-
tees and control of the purse strings. Congress is thus a key institution in the distribution of 
regulatory benefits, a feature the capture theories lack. Here again there is a supply and 
demand for regulation; interest groups compete for benefits which are supplied by the regula-
tory agency, but now the agency is controlled by the will of Congress. Congressmen favor 
agencies that serve their constituencies and retaliate against those who do not by preventing 
career advancements, curtailing budget allocations, and controlling the 
appointment/reappointment processes. 
These two approaches to the study of regulation comprise a literature whlch develops 
the strategies and goals of the actors in the regulatory process. In general, interest groups form 
to pressure politicians for regulation when they believe that they can derive some economic 
benefits larger than their costs of demanding that regulation. On the supply side, regulators , 
faced with the problem of choosing where to allocate the benefits among the many competing 
interest groups, seek to maximize their political support. This study will focus on the capture 
theory of regulation. An in-depth look at the capture theory literature provides a basis for test-
ing both the political actions of regulators and the decisions of industries desiring protection. 
Capture Theories 
"The Theory of Economic Regulation" (Stigler, 1971) is a study of the supply and 
demand of regulation. Stigler's central theme is that regulation is sought by industries and is 
designed to operate for their benefit. He states four main policy outcomes that are sought by 
industries. The first is direct subsidies or cash payments. Stigler claims this is used only when 
elasticity of supply in the industry is low so that there will not be a tendency for new entrants 
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to dissipate the industry's gains by entering the market to claim a share of the subsidy. A 
second type of policy sought by industries is those that affect substitute and complementary 
goods. His example of this is that butter producers wish to suppress margarine and encourage 
production of bread. The third class of policies is price-fixing. Price controls which result in 
higher than competitive rates of return are desired. Finally, industries desire policies that con-
trol the entry of new firms into an industry_D This is especially true of firms that seek protec-
tion against foreign goods. As Stigler points out, the benefits of protection can be dissipated by 
the entry of new firms. 
Stigler's theory says, in effect, that agencies or politicians that regulate industries are 
"captured" in that they respond to industry pressures for regulation. Optimal size is important 
in ensuring that the costs of regulation are not too large and the consumer opposition is not too 
strong; industries are most successful when their benefits are greater than their costs of produc-
ing pressure, and when costs to the opposition are small or dispersed. 
Stigler claims that the benefits of regulation to an individual firm can have limitations; 
for example, the political influence of each firm, not just price and its proportion of output, 
may also determine the distribution of control by individual firms in a regulated industry. 
Furthermore, when an industry is granted regulation, the benefits to the industry generally fall 
short of the costs to society due to deadweight loss. According to Stigler, one would expect a 
democratic society to reject a request for regulation unless the industry controlled a majority of 
the votes in that society. Yet industries that are granted regulation most often make up a 
minority of the voting society. 
13. Stigler, George J. "The Theory of Economic Regulation." Bell Journal of Economics and Managemenl Science, 3: 
(1971), pp. 2-3. 
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Stigler explores the reason why such minorities are able to obtain regulation and 
" ... employ the political machinery to their own ends. "14 He proposes that the political system is 
designed to implement all strongly felt preferences of majorities and many strongly felt prefer-
ences of minorities while disregarding weaker preferences of both. In regulating an industry, 
when the costs to the minority are dispersed among a large majority, it often does not pay for 
members of that majority to examine these costs or to act against them (Olson, 1965). 
Applying Stigler's theory to tariffs, when deadweight loss to society due to granting a 
tariff to a single industry is small and costs of the tariff are dispersed, the political system 
favors the strong preferences of the minority--if that minority has political power or access to 
the political system. Stigler also claims that larger industries seek regulation that costs society 
more and thus causes more opposition from affected groups. And industries that are too small 
need other advantages like concentration to ensure support. Thus size is an important factor in 
obtaining regulation; beyond a certain group size, there are diminishing returns to the benefits 
of regulation and higher costs of organization, but Stigler is not clear on where the cutoffs 
should be, or what the optimum size is for successfully obtaining regulation. 
Finally, industries gain political power by providing "votes and resources" to the 
appropriate political groups in society. The industry supports the political agents who provide 
them regulation. Stigler treats this as a natural part of the system or political process. 
Peltzman formalized Stigler's ideas and hypotheses in "Toward A More General 
Theory of Regulation" (1976). He assumes that regulation results in a transfer of wealth: the 
beneficiaries of regulation pay the regulators (politicians) with votes and money to acquire 
their benefits, which come from a tax or tariff on the consumer. Peltzman further assumes that 
14. Ibid., p. 10. 
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the regulator seeks to maximize his voter support and uses money to mitigate the consumer 
opposition. According to Peltzman, the "critical" decision for the regulator is deciding the size 
of the group that he promises benefits to and the size of the taxed group.15 The regulator seeks 
to maximize his support; formally, Peltzman defmes the goal of the regulator to maximize a 
majority M, where 
M = nf- (N - n)h 
and 
n =size of the beneficiary group 
f = probability of the beneficiary group granting support 
N = total number of potential voters 
h =probability of those who are taxed generating opposition. 
In summary, Peltzman believes that regulation is a device used by politicians (bureau-
crats and members of Congress) to transfer wealth from politically weak members of society 
(taxpayers) to well-organized politically strong interest groups who court the income transfer 
with votes and campaign contributions. 
Becker takes a viewpoint similar to Stigler's and Peltzman's in "A Theory of Competi-
Lion Among Pressure Groups for Political Influence" (1983). It is this work that will be the 
focus of my empirical analysis and thus will be discussed in greater detail than the other 
theories, both here and in the following section. Becker's main theme is that government poli-
cies of regulation correct market failures while favoring the politically powerful. Subsidized 
groups and taxpayers compete for political influence. The outcome depends on the size of each 
15. Peltzman, Sam. 'Toward a More General Theory of Regula!ion." The Journal of Law and Economics, 19: (1976), 
pp. 214-17. 
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group, their effectiveness in producing pressure, and the deadweight cost (inefficiency) of the 
taxes and subsidies. Becker claims that less inefficient policies are more likely to be adopted, 
i.e. supported by politicians, than more inefficient policies. By less inefficient, Becker means 
that given the size of the benefits to the subsidized groups, the deadweight loss is minimized. 
Both Becker and Stigler believe that when a regulatory action benefits a certain group, 
that group should be able to obtain that action. Becker takes this notion one step further to 
claim that the action selected will be the one that is most beneficial to society, i.e., that pro-
vides the given transfer (benefit) with the least deadweight loss to society. Subsidized (regu-
lated) groups that gain the most from the policies they seek (while causing the least harm to 
society) are the ones most likely to be successful in pressuring the political system to adopt 
their policies. Both Becker and Stigler assume that politicians and bureaucrats are "hired" 
(elected) by pressure groups to further these groups ' interests and that they will be "fired" in 
subsequent elections if they do not pursue these goals. 
Becker assumes that two homogeneous groups exist in society: the subsidized group 
(s ) and the taxpayers (t ). Group t is taxed an amount n,R, and groups is subsidized an amount 
nsRs , where n, is the number of individuals in group t and ns is the number of individuals in 
groups . The amount of taxes actually available for transfer, however, is n1F(R1 ), where F(R,) 
is a function of the taxes which incorporates the deadweight loss from the tax. It is assumed 
that F(R1 ) $ R , since deadweight loss diminishes the total tax paid by group t . The actual total 
amount of subsidy raised is nsG(Rs ), where G(Rs) is a function of the subsidy which incor-
porates the deadweight loss due to the subsidy. It is assumed that G(Rs) ~ Rs where the dead-
weight loss accounts for the subsidy being less than the amount raised. Income is redistributed 
by the government away from taxpayers to subsidized groups. 
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The amount of tax imposed on t depends on its political influence function, 11 where 
niF(R1 ) =- 11 (pso p10 x). The total tax is equal to the influence of the taxed group which is a 
function of the political pressure (ps) exerted by s, the political pressure (p1 ) exerted by t, and 
other exogenous factors (x ). So the amount of tax that has to be paid depends on the taxed 
group's influence. The subsidy to s depends also on its influence function, Is where ns G(Rs ) = 
I s(ps , p 1 , x) withps , p 1 , and x defined similarly. Thus the amount of wealth transferred to the 
subsidized group depends on its influence. Further, it is assumed that the subsidy is equal to 
the taxes, nsG(Rs) = n1F(R 1 ) SO that the government balances its budget. Also, JS + 11 = 0, 
which means that the sum of their influence functions is zero since increased influence that 
raises the subsidy must be financed by higher taxes, hence a lower influence for the taxpayers. 
It is assumed that increased influence by one group lowers the influence of the other by an 
equal amount.16 
Groups compete for political influence by increasing their political pressure on the 
government. This is done by spending time, money and energy on lobbying, getting votes, and 
other forms of political pressuring. Becker defmes pressure functions for each group as Ps = 
Ps (ms , ns) and p 1 = p 1 (m1 , n1 ) where ni is the size of group i and mi is the total expenditure of 
group i. Hence pressure depends on the size of the group and the amount of money it spends. 
Also, ai is defined as the amount spent per individual on pressure, thus, mi = ai ni . Becker 
further argues that groups will want to control any free riding which might result from regula-
tion. They will also want to increase their pressure for some policy when that additional pres-
sure will raise their influence (i.e. when an increase in Pi will significantly raise /). This 
16. Becker, Gary S. "A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups For Political Influence." The Quarterly 
Journal ofEcorwmics. Vol. XCVID, (August 1983), pp.375-76. 
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comprises Becker's first proposition: groups that become more efficient at producing political 
pressure (by controlling free riding or just getting better at lobbying) will be able to raise their 
influence and thus raise their subsidies or reduce their taxes. That is, car ldp,) > 0 and 
(iJ!tliJpt) > 0 . Furthermore, the effectiveness of their pressure is determined by their efficiency 
at producing pressure relative to other groups, not their absolute efficiency, since each group's 
influence is a function of both Ps and Pt. 
The net income of each member of s and t is defmed by Zs and zt where 
Zs = z: + Rs -as and Zt = Zt- Rt -at. Here z: and zt are the initial incomes of each member 
of the respective groups. Thus the net gain to each member of s from government redistribu-
tion is (Zs - z:) which is their income after redistribution minus their initial income. And the 
net loss to each member of group t from government redistribution is (Zt- Zt) which is the 
taxpayer's initial income minus their income after paying taxes. Each group in Becker's model 
seeks to maximize its income with respect to the amount each individual must spend on pres-
sure. That is, each group wants to maximize its income after redistribution. Thus, group i 
wants to maximize Z; subject to the constraint of its political influence function, since its 
influence determines its subsidy or tax. 
For the subsidized group: 
Similarly, for the taxed group: 
Max{a) zt = Max{a) (Zt-Rt - at) subject to nt F(Rt)=-lt(ps,pl'x). 
These equations can be solved for the equilibrium values of as, at, Ps, and Pt ·11 
17. See Becker's Mathematical Appendix, pp. 397-99 for details of his model. 
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Becker deals extensively with how deadweight cost affects pressure, taxes and subsi-
dies. A higher deadweight cost means a reduction in the equilibrium subsidy. This higher cost 
diminishes pressure exerted by the subsidized group since the greater the deadweight cost of a 
tax is, the smaller the revenue left for the subsidy will be. On the other hand, a higher dead-
weight cost encourages pressure by taxpayers to reduce the subsidy because reducing their 
taxes has a correspondingly smaller effect on the available subsidy. That is, they can pressure 
for a reduction in taxes without worrying about increased opposition from the subsidized 
group. The pressure of the subsidized group is reduced. Thus subsidized groups have an 
"intrinsic disadvantage" when deadweight cost is high, which Becker claims may be partially 
overcome with optimum size or more efficient production of pressure. 
Regulatory actions with higher efficiency have lower deadweight loss, so they yield a 
higher revenue, or subsidy, from a given tax. When deadweight loss is small and benefits are 
large with an action sought by the subsidized group, then this group has the advantage in 
affecting political outcomes. The subsidized group will exert more pressure than the taxed 
group and will get its policy adopted unless the taxed group becomes more efficient at produc-
ing pressure. Becker claims that these actions are much more likely to be adopted than actions 
with lower efficiency. Becker's model, then, predicts that the competition of political pressure 
groups produces more efficient outcomes.18 So in correcting market failures, the government 
appears to favor the politically powerful because the competition among pressure groups leads 
to this result; competition produces the most efficient wealth transfers and methods of taxation. 
Workers, Becker claims, may also be able to assist in the production of pressure, thus 
exerting influence and eliciting political support. For example, when imports result in layoffs 
18. Becker, pp. 383-84. 
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and reductions in earnings, tariffs or quotas on these imports may raise worker's earnings by 
more than the deadweight cost to society due to the protection. Thus, workers will be likely to 
participate in pressuring the government for regulation. 
Finally, politically successful groups tend to be small relative to the taxpaying group; 
benefits to each member would thus be greater, since the costs would be distributed among the 
large group and the benefits concentrated in the smaller group. Furthermore, the most efficient 
methods of taxation are favored by both groups. More efficient taxation means less dead-
weight cost to society. Less deadweight cost means higher subsidies for the beneficiaries and a 
lower resistance from, or production of pressure by taxpayers. Taxpayers will be less inclined 
to spend time and money to produce pressure if the amount raised can be contained through 
efficient means of taxation. Taxpayers will be indifferent to how they pay a fixed amount of 
taxes, but the subsidized group will want to maximize its revenue--hence the need for max-
imum efficiency of the transfer policy. 
Summary 
The Stigler, Peltzman, and Becker papers all deal with the regulation of industries, the 
behavior of key actors, the purpose of the regulation, and its effects on these industries and on 
society in general. Stigler explains or rationalizes regulation as a tool of industries in seeking 
payments, entry limitations, price fixing, or the like. Peltzman formalizes Stigler's ideas and 
seeks to explain the behavior of regulators (politicians) in responding to well-organized, 
powerful political groups in society that seek the benefits of regulation. The regulators seek to 
maximize their political support by choosing the optimum size group of beneficiaries and tax-
payers. Finally, Becker argues that regulators behave efficiently by showing that in correcting 
market failures, they choose the outcome that is most efficient (i .e. that which provides a given 
benefit to the subsidized group with the least deadweight loss to society). 
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Becker's Pressure Group Model 
Since the Stigler, Peltzman, and Becker models all deal with very similar concepts and 
properties of regulation, this section will focus on a single model, namely the Becker model. 
From his political equilibrium conditions, Becker derives comparative static properties which 
are crucial to the statement and understanding both of his propositions and the hypotheses that 
will be tested. First I will restate the Becker model and the conditions needed to derive his 
comparative static properties; then, using these properties, I will go through the proofs of the 
propositions relevant to this work, which will later be tested. 
Given the specifications described in the previous section above, the subsidized group 
must solve the problem: 
Max{a,} (Z; +R, - a,) subject ton, G(R,) = l ' (p,,p,,x). 
where R, is implicitly a function of a,, a,, n, , n,, and x . 
The taxed group is faced with a similar problem, 
Max {a) (Z:- R, - a,) subject ton, F (R,) =- l'(p,,p,,x). 
where R, is also defmed as a function of a,, a,, n, , n,, and x . Recall the following properties of 
Becker' model: 
zt = initial income of group i , i e {s , t} 
R, = subsidy to each member of group s 
R, = tax on each member of group t 
n; = size of group i 
a; = expenditures per member of group i 
P; = P; (m; , n; ) ; m; = n; a; 
dp· 
~ > 0 for group i, since Becker assumes that pressure increases 
om; 
when expenditures increase. 
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Equations (I') and (2') can then be solved for the optimum per capita expenditures, a;, a,· and 
the optimum pressures, p;, p; of each group. 
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Alternatively, using the implicit function theorem, (1 ') and (2') can be rewritten as: 
'I'.(p.,p,, n,, n,) = 0, 
'I'1 (psop1 , n •• n,) = 0. 
(1") 
(2") 
Finally, by totally differentiating the system of equations defined by (1") and (2''), Becker 
derives the comparative static properties needed to prove his propositions. Total differentia-
tion with respect toPs, p,, and any arbitrary parameter a yields: 
. a'I', 
Lettmg -a- = a 11 , 
Ps 
and 
then by substitution, 
a'I'. a'I', a'I'. 
-a- dp, +-a- dp, +-a-da= o 
Ps p, a 
a'I', a'I', a'I', 
-a- dp, +-a- dp, +-a-da= o. 




















aa = ta. 
dp. dp, 
By solving for - and - and determining the sign of both the matrix A and its com-
da da 
ponents, Becker shows that 
dp, 




sgn- =-sgn t . 
d CJ. a 
(8) 
These properties will now be used to redo Becker's propositions. 
Proposition 1 : 
If a group becomes more efficient at producing political pressure, it will be able to 
raise the subsidy that it receives or reduce the taxes that it pays. 




- > 0 and 
m, 
where Pi is pressure and mi is expenditure for group i. He 
claims in Proposition 1 that an increase in efficiency will increase the subsidy to group s or 
aR, aRt op, 
decrease the taxes of group t . That is, -- > 0 and -- < 0 where P!. - and op:,. op!, om, 
Proof: 
aR, 
First, -- can be rewritten as ap:,. 
But from (1) above, 
om, 
where -- = n - the size of group s, n, > 0, aa, s 
19. See Becker's Mathematical Appendix, pp. 397-99. 
1 
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and p! = efficiency of group s at producing pressure, p! > 0 . 
aR, 
So -a-> 0 . 
Ps 
ap, ap, 
Secondly,--> 0 because by equation (7), ap:,. sgn -- = sgn s , ap:,. Pm 
a'¥, 
where s , = -- · 
Pm ap:,. 
Or, 
s ' P, 
a1• ap:,. ----ap, ap:,. 
> o?o ac 
aRs 
aR, aR, ap, 
Similarly, using equations (2) and (8), it can be shown that -,-= -a---, < 0. apm Pr apm 
Proposition 2 : 
An increase in the deadweight loss reduces the equilibrium subsidy to group s and 
increases the taxes of group t. 
In Becker's model, deadweight losses for group s and group t are defmed, respec-
Lively, as the costs of providing the subsidy and of imposing the tax. The functions G (R.) and 
F (R 1 ) incorporate the deadweight losses so that, 
G (R.) ~ Rs 
F(R1 ) ~R1 • 
20. See Becker's Mathematical Appendix, equation A.l5. 
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If deadweight losses increase, this implies that G(Rs) increases and F(R1 ) decreases. That is, 
G (Rs) and F (R1 ) respectively get further away from the actual subsidy received, Rs, and the 
aRs aRr 
actual taxes paid, R 1 • Proposition 2, then, states that aG < 0 and aF > 0. 
Proof: 
aRs 
From Proposition 1, we know that -a-- > 0. 
'Ps 
a'Ps a'Ps 




so = < 0 .21 
Similarly, using Proposition 1 and equation (8), it can be shown that 
21. See Becker's Mathematical Appendix, equation A.l6. 
22. See Becker's Mathematical Appendix, equation A.l7. 
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Becker's second proposition states that, the higher the deadweight loss of some regula-
tory action is, the lower the subsidy to s will be. So when deadweight loss is high, in order to 
collect a fixed amount of tax revenue for transferring to group s, additional taxes must be 
imposed to offset the high deadweight loss. This leads to Becker's corollary to Proposition 2. 
Corollary 2 : 
Policies that raise efficiency (i.e., have a lower deadweight loss) are more likely to be 
adopted than policies that lower efficiency. 
Proof: 
A lower deadweight loss (which implies lower G and higher F) encourages pressure by 
s and discourages opposing pressure by t, since by Proposition 2 
aps 
- < 0 and ac 
ap, 
aF < o. 
Thus, group s would pressure for a policy with a smaller deadweight loss, since this would 
increase the available subsidy. Group t, however, would reduce its pressure against such a pol-
icy, since lower deadweight costs would increase the tax revenue available for subsidies, which 
would potentially allow for an overall decrease in taxes. Thus both groups prefer more 
efficient policies. 
Furthermore, groups is said to have an "intrinsic advantage" when G' < F'. This is 
because when the adoption of a policy results in n. Rs > n, R 1 , or equivalently at the margins, 
n. d.R. > n, d.R,, then the efficiency is raised in favor of group s . But n. G (R, ) = n, F (R, ), which 
implies G 'n,d.Rs = F'n,d.R,. Son, dRs > n, d.R, iff G' < F'. Therefore, G' < F ' is a necessary and 
sufficient condition for groups to have the advantage in pressuring for a certain policy. Furth-
ermore, group s 's advantage increases as deadweight loss decreases (i .e. G decreases and F 
increases, or equivalently G' decreases and F' increases ) because Ps increases and p, 
decreases, so s 's influence goes up and t ' s influence goes down. (Recall ~/' > 0 and ~~· < 0.) 
'Ps 'Pt 
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So groups will increase pressure to raise its subsidy. 
On the other hand, a higher deadweight loss encourages pressure by t and discourages 
ap. ap, " I. .th pressure by s because ac < 0 and aF < 0. Group s would not pressure lOr a po ICY WI a 
aR. 
larger deadweight loss because this would reduce its subsidy: ac < 0 by Proposition 2. But 
group t would increase its pressure, since a higher deadweight loss decreases the amount of 
revenue available for transfer to s, which leads to an increase in taxes in order to provide a 
given subsidy to groups. Thus both groups are better off if the deadweight loss is smaller, i.e., 
policies are more efficient. 
Group 1 is said to have an "intrinsic advantage" when F' < G '. This is because when 
the adoption of a policy results in n, R, > ns Rs, or equivalently n, d.R, > ns dRs, then the taxes 
being paid by group t are higher than the subsidy received by group s, so group t will have the 
advantage in pressuring against such policies. But n, dR, > n, dRs iff F' < G '. So F' < G' is a 
necessary and sufficient condition for group 1 to have the advantage over group s. Further-
more, group 1 's advantage increases as deadweight costs increase, because p, goes down and p, 
goes up; so 1 's influence goes up while s 's influence does down. Thus group 1 will increase its 
pressure to prevent an increase in taxes. 
In summary, Proposition 2 and its Corollary imply that a lower deadweight loss gives 
group s an advantage over 1 in influencing policy makers. So policies with a lower deadweight 
loss are more likely to be adopted. Policies with a higher deadweight loss, however, give 
group 1 an advantage overs in influencing policy makers. So policies with a higher deadweight 
loss are less likely to be adopted. Furthermore, policies with a lower deadweight loss increase 
the equilibrium subsidy. So Becker's model predicts that policies with a lower deadweight 
loss are not only more likely to be adopted, but also will be preferred by both group s and 
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group t because of their higher efficiency. 
Proposition 3 : 
Politically successful groups tend to be small relative to the size of the groups taxed to 
pay their subsidies. 
An increase in the size of the taxed group ( nt) results in a decrease in pressure by 
group t because the tax per member will decrease. That is, 
Proof: 




a Is _l_ [ apt l 
aps an, am, 
aF 
aRt 
F F" ---==- > o.23 
nt(F'? 
So if a subsidy is financed by a larger group of taxpayers, the opposition will be smaller. 
An increase in the size of the subsidized group, on the other hand, increases the pres-
sure by group s as long as the group continues to become more efficient at producing pressure, 
aRs 
(i.e. as long as -a-> 0; see Becker's footnote 12). So 
ns 
23. See Becker's Mathematical Appendix, equation A.19. 
Proof: 





So if the size of the subsidized group increases, its pressure will continue to increase until a 
point is reached where, because of the greater inefficiency of a large political group, the sub-
sidy per member actually begins to decrease. 
Protectionism and Becker's Model 
Using his framework, Becker's model can be rewritten to facilitate the testing of his 
propositions in the context of industries seeking protection from the International Trade Com-
mission. The ITC supplies subsidies, through the use of tariffs and quotas, to industries which 
seek such regulation. According to Becker, his model should predict which industries will be 
successful in pressuring policy makers for protection. 
Assume, for ease of illustration, that the supply and demand equations are known to be 
linear for some consumer good, x. 




where a, b, c , d , '2:. 0. 
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D(p) =a- bp 
S(p)=c +dp 








SHORT RUN SUPPLY AND DEMAND LONG RUN SUPPLY AND DEMAND 
Diagram 3 Diagram 4 
s' 
In the short run (Diagram 3), if a tariff t is imposed on x, the revenue collected by the govern-
ment for redistribution is equal to the shaded area (A +B). But the subsidized group loses the 
amount (B +D) in producer surplus, while the taxed group loses the amount (A+ C) in consu-
mer surplus. The area (C +D), the amount lost in surplus but not collected by the government, 
is defined as the deadweight loss from the tariff policy. The size of the areas A, B, C, and D 
are determined by the size of the tariff t, the elasticity of demand Eo, and the elasticity of sup-
ply Es of good x, where the elasticities of demand and supply are defined respectively as how 
the quantities demanded and supplied depend on a change in the price of x . So A , B , C, and D 
are each defined as functions of 't, Eo, and Es . That is, 
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A =A ('t, Ev , Es) 
B = B ('t, Ev, Es) 
C = C ('t, Ev, Es) 
D =D('t, Ev, Es). 
The functions F and G from Becker's model can now be defined in terms of govern-
ment revenues and deadweight loss, as described above by the functions A , B , C, and D . Let 
which satisfies the government's budget constraint, n,F(R,)- n.G(R.) = 0. Taking into 
account the losses in consumer and producer surplus and the deadweight costs, the actual tax 
and subsidy are defined by, 
n,R,=A+B+C 
n.R.= A +B - (B +D)= A - D . 
Note that F(R,) ~R, and G(R. ) ~Rs which are exactly the conditions of Becker's model. 
I will assume in this work that the industries face competitive markets and have con-
stant returns to scale in production, hence perfectly elastic long run supply curves (see Diagram 
4); this presumes that the transfer and the deadweight loss depend only on elasticity of demand, 
not on the elasticity of supply. Note also that with flat supply curves, the areas B and D are 
each zero, but the conditions placed on F, G, R, , and R. still hold. Thus, the areas A and C, 
which comprise respectively the total wealth transfer and deadweight loss, are determined only 
by 't and ev . 
Given a fixed tariff rate 't, consider the affect of imposing 't on goods with different 
elasticities of demand. If ev increases (i.e. demand becomes more inelastic), then the wealth 
transfer A will always increase, while the deadweight loss C will always decrease, as long as 
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the demand curve crosses both S and S', or in other words, the tax is not so great as to result in 
zero demand. That is, -~ ::?: slope of D(p) ::?: -oo. So the following conditions hold: 
q 




Pressure will be defined in terms of factors that influence the ability of each group to 
affect policy outcomes. For the industries seeking protection, their ability to influence policy 
makers will be a function not only of total group expenditures and size as in Becker's work, 
but also such factors as their concentration, unionization, and the number of firms involved in 
the petitioning process. Each of these is related in some sense to the costs of organization of 
an industry seeldng regulation. 
First, the industry will be more efficient at producing political pressure and securing a 
desired subsidy if its output from production is concentrated in a smaller number of firms. 
This is because an industry with a smaller number of firms should have lower costs of organi-
zation and thus be more efficient at producing political pressure. For example, an industry 
with one versus one hundred firms will be much better at coordinating actions and making 
decisions than the hundred-firm industry. So pressure will be a function of the degree of con-
centration in the industry. 
A union may also have an effect on an industry's efficiency at producing political pres-
sure. Unions are generally organized, and thus better at coordinating actions and maldng deci-
sions. Freeman and Medoff (1984), among others, have found both that unions have been 
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successful in lobbying for policies that benefit workers as a whole and that legislators 
representing unionized districts tend to support unions' political goals.25 Thus, unionization 
should have a positive effect on the ability of an industry to apply pressure on the political sys-
tern. 
Finally, a third factor which may affect an industry's production of pressure is whether 
or not finns pressure as a group. If a group of finns, which make up a significant proportion of 
an entire industry, lobbies together for regulation, they presumably have overcome the prob-
lems of organization and free riders. If there are too many free riders, the benefits will be so 
dispersed that it will not be worthwhile for a single finn to undergo the costs of applying pres-
sure on the political system (Olson, 1965). Schattschneider (1935) and Key (1958) both find 
that American businesses have historically been well organized and, in small groups, have 
wielded a surprising amount of lobbying power. 
The degrees of concentration, unionization, and free riding problems are, in some 
sense, all measures of the costs of organization which affect the efficiency of producing politi-
cal pressure and securing desired political outcomes. Thus, the political pressure functions of s 
and t will be defined as follows: 
p, = p, (m,, n,) 
where m; and n; are defined as before, and 
cs = concentration in the industry 
us = unionization of an industry 
fs = number of finns involved in a petition. 
25. 1. Richard B. Freeman and James L. Medoff, What Do Unions Do? (New York: Basic Books Inc., 1984),pp. 192-
200. 
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As discussed earlier, the goal of each group is to maximize its income (that is increase 
its subsidy or decrease its taxes) subject to the constraints placed on its ability to influence pol-
icy makers. The first order conditions to the maximization problems are identical to equations 
(1 ') and (2'). These equations can now be solved for the optimum per capita expenditures a; , at· 
and the optimum pressures p;, p; of each group as before. 
Alternatively, (1') and (2') can be rewritten as 
'l's [Ps (ms , n.,Cs ,Us ./s ), Pt(mt,nt)J = 0 
'l't [Ps (mso ns , Cs,Us./s), Pt(mt,nt)J =0. 
Or, using the implicit function theorem 
By totally differentiating this system of equations with respect to p., p1 , and any arbitrary 
parameter a, the comparative static properties can be derived as before. 
Using this new characterization of Becker's model described above, we can now test 
the previous propositions using new variables which are relevant to the regulation of trade. 
Hl: Tariff policies that result in a larger subsidy and a lower deadweight loss are more 
likely to be adopted than policies that result in a lower subsidy and higher deadweight 
loss. 
If demand for some consumer good xis very inelastic (i .e. ED is close to 0), then the 
deadweight loss from a tariff on x will be smaller than that from a tariff on a more elastically 
demanded good (see equation 10 above). Also, the more inelastic the demand, the higher the 
subsidy will be for a given tariff rate 't (see equation 9). Hypothesis 1 states that policies 
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granting higher tariffs on more inelastically demanded goods are not only more efficient than 
tariffs on goods with a more elastic demand, but also are preferred by policy makers, produc-
ers, and consumers. Producers pressure policy makers for higher subsidies, while consumers 
want lower taxes. The goal of policy makers is to maximize their voter support and minimize 
their opposition. By putting tariffs on goods with more inelastic demands, the policy makers 
can accomplish their goals and satisfy both producers and consumers. 
In other words, on the producer side, given a fixed tariff rate -c, 
Proof: 
d(n,R, ) 
Under the condition of long run perfectly elastic supply, n,R, = A (-c,eD ) . So ()A > 0. 
Equation (9) states that, :A > 0. Thus, 
oeD 
Q.E.D. 
So producers should prefer that a given tariff -c be put on inelastically demanded goods, so that 
the available subsidies will be larger. (Note that this may be true regardless of the elasticity of 
demand on their own product, since producers will be concerned about not only the increase in 
producer surplus from the tariff, but also the transfer payments they may receive from the 
government out of the tariff revenue collected.) 
On the consumer side, assuming the government wants to collect a fixed amount of 
revenue for transferring from consumers to producers (i.e. for a fixed subsidy A), then 
d(n,R,) ()C 
""C "" < 0. o oeD 
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Proof: 
Under the condition of long run perfectly elastic supply, n,R, =A +C. So for A fixed, 
o(n,R, ) o(n,R,) oC 




ac :. < o. 
uf.o 
Q.E.D. 
So consumers also should prefer that tariffs be put on more inelastically demanded goods, 
since the same amount of revenue can be collected with a smaller tariff. 
These conclusions are the same as those of Becker's as stated in Proposition 2 and its 
Corollary. Since revenue collected by the government under a tariff is assumed to be redistri-
buted to producers through assistance, loans, tax breaks, or some other form of help, producers 
and policy makers should prefer policies which carry a smaller deadweight loss and yield a 
larger revenue to be redistributed for a given tax. Furthermore, even in the 19th century, when 
tariffs were used as a major source of federal revenue, the same argument should apply. 
Before income taxes were imposed in the U.S. in the early 1900s, one of the only sources of 
government revenue was from tariffs on foreign imports; so if the goal of the government was 
to raise revenue, tariffs would have been placed on goods where the deadweight loss was small 
and the revenue large. Becker's proposition implies that a bias exists in favor of these more 
efficient policies. Thus, according to his model, we should observe a much higher incidence of 
protection being granted to industries that manufacture goods for which demand is more ine-
lastic. 
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H2: An increase in the size of an industry has a positive affect on the equilibrium subsidy. 
Proof: 
aRs 1 
First, recall that -a-= 
'Ps p!.ns 
> 0; further, from Proposition 3, aa'Ps > 0. Thus, if the size of 
ns 
the subsidized group increases, its pressure will go up, increasing its subsidy. Therefore, 
Q.E.D. 
The theory of regulation presented here emphasizes the size of pressure groups as an 
important factor for both industries seeking protection and regulators granting protection. 
Benefits that are concentrated in a relatively small subsidized group with costs dispersed 
among many taxpayers will be least opposed, since it does not pay for the taxpayers to protest 
a small cost. However, the industry or firm must be large enough to exert political pressure on 
the regulators, but not too large so as the benefits gained will be too diluted to be worth their 
while to exert pressure. Becker claims that there is an optimum size for pressure groups, but he 
is ambiguous as to what that optimum size should be. Seemingly, a larger group will be better 
at pressuring the government to grant them their policy provided that the taxpaying group is 
relatively much larger. Thus a larger industry should be more effective at securing protection 
for its good. Or more precisely, the propensity to get protection increases with size, but at a 
decreasing rate. 
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Hypotheses H3 through H5 will each be stated and explained with a general proof 
given at the end, since all three are derived similarly. 
H3: Unionization of an industry increases the equilibrium subsidy. That is, 
Since unions are generally organized and better able to pressure politicians for desired policies, 
the marginal product of unionization, p~ > 0. Hypothesis 3 states that if an industry becomes 
more efficient at producing political pressure because of unionization in the industry, then it 
will be able to raise its subsidy. 
When a petition for protection is filed to the International Trade Commission, indus-
tries, firms, and workers (unions or associations) may be among the petitioners. According to 
the theory of regulation presented here, unionization should be a positive influencing force on 
the ability of an industry or firm to get protection. As discussed earlier, organized unions have 
been successful in pressuring the government for desired policies that benefit workers (see 
Freeman and Medoff 1984). Thus, it can be tested whether or not the involvement of unions or 
worker associations has had an influence on the ability of industries to get protection. 
H4: Industries with a higher degree of concentration are more likely to increase their subsi-
dies. That is, 
d(n8 R8 ) dp8 
- -- > 0, where p% "' . 
dp: des 
The more concentrated the production of output in an industry is, the more efficient it will be at 
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producing political pressure because of lower costs of organization; so we can assume that the 
marginal product of concentration, p~ > 0. Hypothesis 4 states that if an industry becomes 
more efficient at producing political pressure because of higher concentration, then it will be 
able to increase its subsidy. 
The concentration of an industry should affect political outcomes because an industry 
with a small number of individual firms should have lower costs of organization, and thus 
should presumably be more efficient at producing political pressure and obtaining benefits. In 
general, according to the Becker model, the concentration ratio of an industry (among other 
factors) should affect organizational costs; thus an industry with a high concentration should be 
better at pressuring the political system to grant them protection and subsidies. 
HS: Groups of firms are more likely than individual firms to increase their equilibrium sub-
sidy. That is, 
When a single firm petitions for protection, one would expect that firm to control a very large 
share of the market for its particular good, (i.e. one would expect a high concentration ratio in 
that industry). Otherwise, the costs incurred by a single firm pressuring for the policy may 
outweigh the benefits which will be dispersed among all producers (free rider problem). A 
group of firms which together dominate a market should be better at pressuring policy makers. 
Thus, the number of firms petitioning for the regulation should help predict the success of a 
request for protection. 
Since a small organized group of firms should be more effective at producing political 
pressure than a single firm, we can assume that the marginal product of involving additional 
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firms in a petition for subsidies and protection is positive. That is, pj > 0. Hypothesis 5 states 
that if an industry becomes more efficient at producing political pressure because more firms 
are involved in the petitioning process, then it will be able to increase its equilibrium subsidy. 
Proof: 
In general, for H3-H5, we need to show that: 
a(n8 R8 ) 
apt 
aRs 
First, recall that -a-
Ps 
1 
> 0. From Proposition 1, if a group becomes more efficient at 
aRs 
producing political pressure, it will be able to raise its subsidy. In other words, > 0, ap:,. 
aps 
where p:,. =-a- > 0 denotes the marginal product of expenditures. Alternatively, consider 
ms 
other factors that affect the efficiency of an industry at producing political pressure. In particu-
lar, consider the marginal product of i, pt for any i e {us ,c
8 
Js} . By Proposition 1, 
aps a'Ps 
sgn -- = sgn a s • where apt Pi 
ar ap:,. ----
a'Ps aps apt ap:,. 
ac >0, if - -> 0. apt apt 
aRs 
aps 
The assumption that _ m_ > 0, is reasonable because for any i E {us-es Js }, an increase in pt apt 
will have a positive affect on an industry's marginal product of expenditures. That is, an 
industry will be able to produce more pressure for the same expenditures if there is an increase 
in either unionization, concentration, or the number of firms petitioning. Therefore, 
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Q.E.D. 
In summary, hypotheses HI through H5, which are derived from Becker's model, are 
readily testable in the context of industries seeking trade regulation. Industries compete for the 
political favors of the regulators, while the regulators maximize their own political support by 
supplying subsidies to key industries which demand policy actions and provide that support. 
According to the pressure group model presented above, those industries that are granted subsi-
dies will generally be more organized, larger, and better at producing political pressure; and, 
the policies they seek will be more efficient in terms of deadweight loss, so that opposition will 
be minimized. These hypotheses about which industries are most likely to be granted regula-
tion will be tested using data on regulatory decision by the International Trade Commission. 
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CHAPTER : DATA AND ECONOMETRICS 
To test the hypotheses of pressure group competition developed in Chapter 3, the esti-
mations are conducted at three different levels. First, I look at the supply of regulation in an 
attempt to understand the behavior of the ITC. I seek to predict on what basis the lTC grants 
protection to industries; that is, what factors best explain the regulators' choices of which 
industries to protect. At this level, only those industries that actually apply to the lTC for regu-
lation are used in the estimations; the regulatory decision is conditional on industries petition-
ing for relief. Next, I look at the set of all manufacturing industries in order to understand the 
demand for regulation. Why do some industries apply for protection while others do not? In 
other words, what factors best explain industry incentives to seek protection from the lTC? 
Finally, I use a nested logit model, (see McFadden, 1978) to incorporate both the supply and 
the demand sides of the regulatory issue. By applying a nested logit model, I wish to deter-
mine whether an industry's decision to apply for protection is affected by its perception of the 
likelihood of receiving a favorable lTC ruling. That is, are the three possible final outcomes 
(apply and get protection, apply and do not get protection, and do not apply), equally likely, or 
is an industry's decision to apply conditional on its probability of being successful? These 
questions will be explored in the following analysis. 
A number of other regulatory studies that have focused on the ITC (see for example 
Shughart and Tollison, 1985 or Goldstein, 1986), have dealt only with either the demand or the 
supply side of the regulatory issue. In predicting regulatory behavior, however, both the deci-
sion of an industry to apply (or not) for relief and also the decision to grant that relief may be 
crucial factors in determining the probability of a final positive lTC decision. It is possible that 
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industries compare the utility from the alternative of not applying with the maximum expected 
utility that is possible from their applying, and choose the best available alternative accord-
ingly. Ignoring the industry decision of whether or not to apply may result in a self-selection 
bias in the estimations of the supply for regulation. Thus, a nested logit model is used to test 
for the problem of selectivity. 
Economic Theory 
From existing trade and regulatory literature, several factors for each of the supply and 
demand sides of regulation can be identified, which, respectively, may influence the actions of 
the regulators and industries. 
Supply: 
On the supply side, general theories of regulation (e.g. Stigler, Peltzman, and Becker) 
predict that regulators seek to maximize their political support To accomplish this goal, the 
regulator needs to satisfy key interest groups that will provide that support. In other words, the 
regulator will seek to satisfy politically strong groups in society at the expense of politically 
weak groups. The political strength of interest groups, particularly of industries seeking trade 
regulation, depends on several key factors which are readily identifiable in the regulation litera-
ture, and are directly linked to the hypotheses of Becker's model discussed in Chapter 3. 
According to regulatory theories, in particular the Becker model, one factor that should 
affect the supply of regulation is the efficiency of policy alternatives. That is, both the nature 
of the regulation and which industries are granted regulation are decided by politicians on the 
basis of what offers the least costs and greatest benefits to society. Regulation will be granted 
to industries where the deadweight costs of the policy are lowest and the subsidies are largest. 
Thus the group that finally receives support is the most efficient in terms of costs and benefits, 
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as stated in Hypothesis 1 of Chapter 3. A good measure of the deadweight costs of a tariff on a 
certain good is the elasticity of demand for that good. More inelastically demanded goods 
have a lower deadweight loss for a given tariff rate. Tariffs on these goods are more efficient; 
thus industries that produce more inelastically demanded goods should be more likely to 
receive regulation. 
The political significance of the distribution of costs and benefits is emphasized in both 
the regulation theories developed by Stigler, Peltzman and Becker, and the theory of collective 
action developed by Olson. Benefits which are distributed to a single industry with costs 
dispersed over a large number of taxpayers are not likely to be opposed. This is because tax-
payers have little incentive to organize and oppose small dispersed costs. So regulators are 
more likely to supply benefits when no particular public sector bears all of the costs. That is, 
industries are more likely to be granted regulation as long as there is a large taxpaying group. 
A second factor, then, that may affect an industry's ability to influence regulators is its 
size. According to Olson, it has been observed that groups that are small relative to the size of 
any opposing group are more effective at organizing and taking action.26 Since industries are 
small relative to the taxpaying groups in society, they should be more effective at pressuring 
for higher tariffs than taxpayers should be at opposing such policies. However, successful 
pressuring of politicians also necessarily requires an ability to command power and influence; 
thus larger industries, which are generally more powerful and persuasive, should be more 
effective than smaller ones at influencing the political system and obtaining desired policies. 
Also, according to Becker, small groups may not be able to take advantage of economies of 
26. Olson, pp. 52. 
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scale in the production of pressure.27 Yet there are diminishing returns to the size of pressure 
groups; if a group becomes too large, the benefits of regulation will be too dispersed to be 
worth their while. So political strength should increase with the size of an industry seeking 
protection, but at a decreasing rate, as stated in Hypothesis 2. To test the hypothesis that size 
affects policy outcomes, good proxies for the size of an industry are its total value of shipments 
or total employment. The higher an industry's value of shipments or employment, the greater 
should be its ability to pressure for and obtain regulation. 
Related to this notion is the political significance of group organization. The degree of 
organization of an interest group will affect the supply as well as the demand for regulation. 
This is because the costs of making decisions and coordinating actions are much smaller when 
a group is more organized; thus the group will be more efficient at producing pressure and 
affecting policy outcomes. So industries that are in some way more organized will have more 
political strength, and thus will be more likely to affect the decisions of politicians who supply 
the regulation. This notion comprises Hypotheses 3, 4, and 5. Several variables will be used 
as proxies for measures of the degree of organization of an industry. Concentration and unioni-
zation are two good measures for the degree of organization. In general, industries with higher 
degrees of concentration and unionization should be more organized and better at pressuring 
policy makers. Higher concentration in an industry implies fewer free rider problems and more 
opportunities for reaching a consensus, thus a greater degree of organization. Unionization 
implies organization and an opportunity for collective action, thus union support should posi-
tively affect an applicants ability to pressure policy makers. A third measure of the degree of 
organization of an interest group is based on whether there is a single-firm or multi-firm 
27. Becker, pp. 395. 
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petition. If the industry pressure group is made up of a number of firms applying together as a 
group for protection, they have presumably overcome some of the costs and barriers to organi-
zation, and thus should be more successful, than a single firm, at applying political pressure. So 
the higher its degree of organization, measured in terms of concentration, unionization, and 
type of petitioner, the more successful an industry will be at affecting policy outcomes. 
A final possible affect on a politicians' decision to supply trade regulation may be due 
to political pressure at a macro or national level. (Takacs, for example, focuses on cyclical 
national economic trends in explaining lTC behavior.) A general slump in the economy, which 
results in such problems as high unemployment, inflation, large deficits, or the like, may put 
pressure on the regulators to take some action to improve the economic conditions of the pub-
lic, especially the more outspoken groups of society. So national economic trends like the U.S. 
trade deficit and the unemployment rate can be used as proxies for national trends that may 
affect the supply of regulation. 
D emand: 
Certain factors exist which may help to determine whether or not an industry will 
demand regulation. For example, loss of market share may drive an industry to seek some 
form of regulation which will raise profits. A good measure of this trend is the percent change 
in domestic market share controlled by each of the industries. In general, industries with a 
relatively large loss in market share should be more likely to demand regulation. Also, an 
industry that is forced to cut costs and lay off employees should by more likely to apply for 
protection. Pressure from workers or unions may drive an industry to seek regulation when 
employment is dropping in the industry. This trend is measured by the percentage change in 
employment in each industry. 
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Another factor affecting an industry's demand for regulation may be the industry's 
prior level of regulation. A highly protected industry is less likely to pressure for additional 
regulation than a relatively unprotected industry, since the costs of acquiring additional regula-
tion would likely exceed the benefits. In other words, there are increasing costs and diminish-
ing returns to acquiring additional regulation. An industry 's existing tariff rate should be a 
good measure of its likelihood of seeking protection. 
Finally, the degree of organization in an industry may affect its decision to pressure for 
regulation. A more organized interest group will be better at pressuring for regulatory benefits 
and securing desired policy outcomes. Also, an industry which is highly organized and con-
trols free riding will face fewer costs and reap larger benefits from pursuing regulation. The 
degree of organization can be measured by the concentration ratio on an industry. Higher con-
centration implies fewer free riders and lower costs of organization, thus a greater likelihood 
that an industry will demand regulation. 
Data 
The data on regulatory decisions by the lTC in this study cover a period of a little more 
that ten years, from the passage of the 1974 Trade Act to the beginning of 1985. These years 
were chosen because the rules under which the lTC operated prior to 1974 were significantly 
different, enough so as to preclude pooling data from before 1974 with data from after 1974. 
The data include all lTC cases considered under the Escape Oause, the Antidumping Act, and 
the Countervailing Duty Investigations discussed earlier. 
On the supply side, there were 616 investigations conducted by the International Trade 
Commission between 1975 and 1984. Of these 616 cases, there are 314 antidumping cases, 
231 countervailing duty cases, and 71 escape clause cases. These were categorized by the four 
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digit Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) code corresponding to each petition. At the four 
digit SIC level, there are 290 industry petitions. (This number is smaller than the total number 
of cases because some four digit industries filed more than one petition. The outcome of the 
industry petitions is the dependent variable; a value of 1 is assigned to industries if any case 
received some form of relief through lTC action in a given year, and a 0 to those that were 
denied relief or protection. About 43% of the industries that filed petitions in these years were 
granted some form of regulatory relief. 
On the demand side, there are 425 four digit SIC manufacturing industries included in 
this study (out of a total of approximately 450) with data for the same period, 1975 to 1984. A 
value of 1 is assigned in cases where at least one petition is filed for any industry in a given 
year, and a 0 to cases where no petitions are filed. Industries filed a petition with the lTC in 
only about 7% of the 4250 entries across the ten years. 
Most of the data used in this study is coded at the four digit SIC level. When data are 
not available at the four digit level, three digit level data are used instead, with entries repeated 
for each corresponding four digit code. The independent variables which are used to explain 
the supply and demand for the regulation of international trade are as follows : 
(1) The elasticities of demand are available for 122 three digit SIC industries (Shiells, Stem, 
& Deardorff, 1985). The elasticities were computed from estimates of cross price elasticities 
of U.S. import demand and measures of import share for these industries using Coumot Aggre-
gation. See Appendix B for the method of computing the elasticities. The elasticities range 
from -3.86 to 1.94 with a mean of -1.06. Among those industries whose goods are more elastic 
are the furniture, drapery, and motorcycle industries, while clocks and watches, plastics, and 
footwear are among the goods with more inelastic demands. Five of the industries in the study 
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have positive elasticity values implying that higher prices leads to greater demand for the 
goods in these industries. These are the nonrubber footwear, leather gloves, fur goods, lumber, 
and radio and television equipment industries. The cross price elasticities for nonrubber 
footwear, leather gloves, and fur goods are extreme outliers; so their price elasticity values will 
be left out of the data analysis. It may be the case that the nature of the select market for such 
goods as fur coats and leather gloves makes demand for these goods increase regardless of a 
rise in their prices; in other words, higher prices in these markets may not discourage con-
sumption perhaps because higher prices, in and of themselves, make these luxury items more 
attractive to their consumers. (See Appendix D for descriptive statistic on the variables used in 
this study.) 
(2) The size of the industry petitioning for protection is measured by the value of total ship-
ments or total employment, both at the four digit SIC industry level. From the theories of 
regulation presented here, size should be a significant factor in affecting policy outcomes. In 
particular, Becker's theory seems to predict that larger groups will be more successful at 
influencing the government (given a sufficiently large taxpaying group). Because of a high 
degree of correlation between the employment and shipment variables, only one will be used in 
the analysis. Employment was chosen over value of shipments because there were fewer miss-
ing data entries for this variable. Also, the employment variable should perform better as a 
proxy for size in measuring an industry's influence over policy outcomes because workers face 
lay-offs if domestic production drops due to increases in foreign imports and politicians tend to 
pay attention to the demands of unions or large organized groups of workers that pressure for 
legislative action. Employment at the four digit SIC level in the industries ranges from 600 in 
the reclaimed rubber industry to over 500,000 employees in the miscellaneous plastics and 
radio and television equipment industries, with a mean of 42,000 overall. 
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(3) The petitioners in the investigations are classified into three categories: single firms (209 
cases), multiple firms (317 cases), and the administration (28 cases), which includes petitions 
filed by members of Congress, a committee of Congress, the President, the Special Trade 
Representative, or the lTC itself. A variety of industries belong to each type of petitioner 
category. 
(4) Unions or worker associations are sometimes included among the petitioners. A value of 
1 was assigned to cases that included one of these groups as petitioners, and a value of 0 to 
those that did not These occurred in mostly the blast furnace and steel industries, but also 
included a variety of others. 
(5) Several variables may be used to capture overall yearly trade related economic trends in 
the U.S. The two that will be used in this study are the yearly percentage change in gross 
national product and the U.S. trade deficit. A higher trade deficit should have a positive effect 
on an industry's request for protection, while the change in GNP should be negatively corre-
lated with protectionist tendencies. This is because policy makers should be more willing to 
help industries when the overall economy is performing poorly than when it is prospering. The 
trade deficit variable ranges from a trade surplus of over $9 billion in 1975 to a deficit of over 
$60 billion in 1983 and $110 billion in 1984. 
(6) Capacity utilization is used as a measure to capture production efficiency in an industry 
and is also coded at the four digit SIC industry level. The percentage of capacity utilization 
varies from 100 percent for certain years in such industries as butter, sugar, cooking oil, period-
icals, ceramic tiles, and certain clothing and footwear industries, to 13 percent in the space 
vehicle and guided missile industries, with a mean of 69 percent. 
(7) An industry's share of the domestic market is an important factor which should affect its 
demand for regulation. If an industry's percentage share of the domestic market drops from 
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one year to the next because of an increase in imports, then it should be more likely to seek 
protection from foreign competition. The change in market share is measured at the four digit 
SIC level and is the change in the percentage of the domestic market controlled by the indus-
try. (The data on value of imports, exports, and shipments were made available by Clinton 
Shiells and Greg Schoepfte, both with the U.S. Department of Labor. See also the Bureau of 
the Census publications on imports, exports, and shipments by SIC code for these years.) This 
variable varies from -4.39 to 8.36 with a mean of -0.01 percent. The industry with the largest 
percentage increase in market share was the primary metals industry, while the largest 
decreases occurred in the fabricated rubber industry and in the primary metals industry in a dif-
ferent year. 
(8) The existing tariff rates of industries recorded at the three digit SIC level should also be 
an indicator of industry demand for protection. The higher the existing tariff rate, the less 
likely an industry will be to demand greater protection. These rates are available from the Tar-
iff Schedules of the United States for the relevant years. The tariff rates on U.S. industries 
range from 0 to 114 percent ad valorem with a mean of 36 percent. Since no major interna-
tional trade negotiations were conducted by U.S. Presidents in the years covered by this study, 
the rates, as a whole, did not change significantly over this period of time. Some changes, 
however, did occur as a result of congressional legislation, limited presidential concessions, or 
lTC investigations. 
(9) Finally, the concentration ratio of the industry should affect both the supply and demand 
for regulation. Concentration is a measure of the percentage of output by the four largest firms 
in an industry. The concentration ratio of an industry, recorded at the four digit SIC level, is 
used as a proxy for an industry 's costs of organization. On the supply side, higher concentra-
tion should indicate lower costs of organization, thus a greater ability to produce pressure and 
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affect policy outcomes. On the demand side, a higher concentration ratio means fewer free rid-
ers and larger gains from demanding regulation. The primary lead industry had the highest con-
centration (100 percent), while specialized industry machinery, and certain wood, printing, and 
concrete industries had concentrations at or below 5 percent, with the overall industry mean at 
39 percent. 
Econometrics 
In this section, I describe the three levels of estimation that are used to explain the sup-
ply of and demand for trade regulation. To estimate the supply and demand for regulation 
separately, a simple logit model is used for each. Given a binary dependent variable, I assume 
a logistic cumulative distribution for the error term, and use a logit model to estimate the 
coefficients of the independent variables. 
* * For the supply side, we assume that si = WXi+ui, where si is a latent continuous 
measure of the likelihood that the lTC will grant protection to some industry i and ui is the 
error term. Assume 
* s = 1 if S; > 0 and 
s = 0 otherwise, 
then prob( s t > 0 I X;) = prob( ui > - WXi) = 1 - F( -WXi) where F( WXi) is a logistic dis-
tribution. The log likelihood function for the logit model is 
Maximizing this with respect to pi gives the coefficients for the best fit of the si to the 
independent variables. In my model, st = P1E + P2P + P3U + P4Z + ui where 
78 
E is the matrix of economic variables specific to each individual industry. (These 
include elasticity of demand, capacity utilization, concentration ratios, employment in 
the industry, market share, and prior tariff rates.) 
Pis a matrix of variables denoting the nature of the petitioner in each case. 
U is a vector denoting union involvement in the petition. 
Z is a matrix of national economic variables that are assumed to have an effect on the 
granting of protection. (This includes the yearly trade deficit or change in GNP.) 
According to the theory of the supply of regulation presented in this paper, one would expect 
each of these variables to affect an industry's probability of getting protection for their goods. 
* * For the demand side, di = YYi + Tli, where di is some unobservable probability that 
an industry will apply for protection from the lTC and Tli is the error term. Maximizing the 
log likelihood function with respect to Yi gives the coefficient for the best fit of the di to the 
independent variables. In the demand model, dt = YYi + Tli where 
y is the matrix of economic variables, specific to each individual industry, that may 
drive an industry to seek regulation from the lTC. (These include such variables as 
industry concentration ratios, percentage change in employment in the industry, 
change in market share, and prior tariff rates.) 
According to theories of the demand for regulation, one would expect that each of these vari-
abies may affect an industry's probability of applying for protection for its goods. 
Finally, a nested logit model will be applied to the study of the demand for and supply 
of trade regulation to determine whether industries base their decisions to apply on their per-
ception of the expected utlity of getting protection. The demanders (industries) face the binary 
choice of whether or not to undergo the costs of applying and pressuring for trade regulation. 
The supplier, the International Trade Commission, makes the binary decision of whether or not 
to grant regulatory benefits to each of the applicants. Here, I want to determine whether self-
selection is a problem in predicting the probability of an industry getting protection; that is, do 
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industries self-select themselves in choosing whether or not to apply? By comparing the utility 
of not applying with the maximum expected utility that can be derived from filing an applica-
tion, an industry can make a rational decision as to the usefulness of his seeking protection 
from the lTC. By using a nested logit model, we can determine whether or not self-selection is 
occurring. 
Diagram 5 (below) illustrates the postulated structure of the model for the actors' 
choices. The model assumes that the regulator's decision is conditional on an industry's 
choice of applying. Stage 1 is the industry's decision of whether or not to file an application 
for protection. Stage 2 is the ITC's decision of whether or not to grant protection to the indus-
try. The nested logit model was chosen because it characterizes the two stage decision process 
well and because it allows for dependence among the attributes of the alternatives. 
Industry's Decision 
Negative A 3 
1WO-STAGE DECISION PROCESS 
Diagram 5 
Suppose the utility of final outcome ri is represented by U,i. The utility can be 
rewritten as the sum of the observable components V,i and the unobservable disturbances Eri : 
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Uri = Vri + Eri for i , r = 1, 2 
where i = industry choice 
r = regulator choice. 
The strict utility of alternative ri , which is defined as the component of utility that is measur-
able or observable, is denoted by Vri and can be expressed in the form 
Vri = W (r I i) + W (i ), where W (r I i) is the strict utility from components that depend 
on both the regulator and the industry decisions, while W (i) is the strict utility from com-
ponents that depend only on the industry choice. The probability that outcome ri is chosen, 
then, is given by: 
(1) 
The £ri are the unobserved characteristics and are assumed to have a generalized 
extreme value (GEV) distribution. I assume a GEV distribution, instead of assuming that the 
Eri 's are independently and identically distributed with an extreme value distribution, because 
it is likely that including the alternative of industries not applying with the positive and nega-
tive lTC decision alternatives would violate the independence of the irrelevant alternatives 
assumption of the logit model. The GEV distribution, as it will be seen below, leads to a 
nested logit structure in which the regulatory commission's decision on granting protection is 
examined, given that the industry files a petition for regulatory action. 
Recall that the generalized extreme value distribution is defined as: 
-EI -E2 - E,. 
F(£1,~, ... ,£n) = exp[-G(e ,e , ... ,e )], 
where the generating function G = G (Y 1, . . . , Y 1 ) is non-negative and homogeneous of 
81 
c = 1, .. . ,J, and for any distinct (c 1, . . . ,ck) from {1, ... ,J}, (JkGICJYc 1 • • • CJYc1 
is non-negative if k is odd and non-positive if k is even. It is known (see McFadden, 1978) 
that the probabilities derived from the GEV distribution define a choice model that is con-
sistent with random utility maximization. These probabilities are given by: 
for c = 1, .. . , J . (2) 
For the case of three alternatives considered in Diagram 5 above, we can define the 
function G as follows: 
= y + [y 1 !cr + 
1 2 (3) 
Then from equation (2), the following conditional probabilities can then be computed. 
(4) 
1- cr 
y + [y t!cr + y l!cr] 
1 2 3 
Conditional on choosing one of the alternatives A 2 and A 3 (e.g. applying for protection and 
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y r=a +Y r=a 
2 3 
1 
y 1 - cr 
3 
1 1 
Y r=a y r=a 2 + 3 
Furthermore, for the probability of an industry applying we have: 
y + y l~cr +Y l~cr [ ]
1-cr 




Assuming that U,i = V,i + E,i where V,i = log Y,i denotes the strict utility of 
alternative ri, we can now identify the components of the strict utility, V,i. Recall, V,i is the 
utility of the final outcome A 1, A 2, or A 3. W (i) is the component of the utility that depends 
only on the industry choice, namely W (Apply) or W (Not Apply), while W (r I i) is just 
W (Positive I Apply) or W (Negative I Apply). As V,i = W (r I i) + W (i ), we assume 
the following: 
W(Not Apply)=- a'y 
W(Apply) = 0 
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W (Positive I Apply)= (1 - cr)WX 
W (Negative I Apply)= 0.28 
Then by substitution, 
VA 
1 
= W (Not Apply) logY 1 = - a'y (8) 
VA
2 
= W(Positive I Apply)+ W(Apply) = logY 2 = (1-cr)WX (9) 
VA
3 
= W(Negative I Apply)+ W(Apply) = logY 3 = 0, 
where , from Diagram 5, 
A 1 =Industry i does not apply 
A 2 =Positive fTC decision given industry i applies 
A 3 =Negative fTC decision given industry i applies. 
(10) 
The vector X comprises the observed characteristics that are believed to explain the regulator's 
choice of whether or not to grant industry i protection (the supply of regulation), and y is the 
vector of observed characteristics that vary with an industry's choice of whether or not to apply 
(the demand for regulation). Next, by substitution, it is possible to calculate the probabilities of 
the alternatives at the two different stages of the decision tree. See Appendix E for details of 
the computations of the probabilities. 
Using equations (5) and (6), the probabilities for the lTC decisions on whether or not 
to grant protection given that an industry applies may be written as: 
28. Note that the utilities are normalized such that W (Apply) = 0 and W (Negative I Apply) = 0. 
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P(A 2 1A2,A 3) 
ei3'X 1 
= 
1 + e 13'X 1 + e-13'X 
(11) 
P(A 3 1A 2,A 3) 
e- f3'X 
= 
1 + e- 13'X 
(12) 
For the industry decision, using equation (7) the probabilities of applying and not applying 
have the following forms: 
e (1 - cr)JNCV 
e - a'y + e (1 - cr)INCV 
1 
(13) = 
1 + e -[a'y + (1 - cr)INCV] 
e - [a'y + (1 - cr)INCV] 
(14) 
1 + e - [a'y + (1 - cr)INCV] 
where the inclusive value, INCV = log [ 1 + e J3'X J . 
Finally, from (11) and (13), the probability of an industry getting protection, given that it 
applies, may be written as: 
1 1 
(15) 
1 + e - [a'y + (1 - cr)INCV] 
A sufficient condition for a nested logit model to be consistent with stochastic utility 
maximization is that the coefficient of the inclusive value, (1 - cr) lie between 0 and 1. (See 
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for example, McFadden 1978.) When the coefficient of the inclusive value is 1, we get the mul-
tinomiallogit form for PA z where the three alternatives are independent. When the coefficient 
is 0, then the probability of an industry gening protection is the product of two logit elements. 
That is, 
wx e 
1 + eWX + e-a.'y 
1 1 
if (1- cr) = 1 
if (1 - cr) = 0. 
The estimation of the probability of outcome A 2, may be done in two stages. First, we 
estimate the parameters, j3, from the conditional probability, P (A 2 I A 2, A 3). After defining 
an inclusive value, INCV, as the log of the denominator of the estimated conditional choice 
model, we then estimate the parameters of a from the probability model P (A 2, A 3), given 
INCV. 
In order to include the inclusive value as an independent variable in the estimation of 
P A , a value for INCV is needed for all industries--both those that apply and those that do not 
2 
apply. Using the estimates of the j3's from those industries that do apply, an inclusive value is 
computed for each industry. The INCV variable denotes the expected maximum utility that 
may be obtained by applying for protection, given one's own characteristics. Thus, in estimat-
ing the industry choice of whether or not to apply, if the coefficient of the inclusive value is 
zero (i.e. cr = 1), then industries choose between the alternatives by comparing the utility of 
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not applying with the maximum expected utility that they can derive from applying.29 
For the nested logit model, the matrix of variables that may affect the supply of regula-
tion is defined by 
X = (elasticity, concentration, capacity utilization, employment, percentage 
change in employment, percentage change in market share, U.S. trade deficit, tariff 
rate).30 
The matrix of variables that may affect the demand for regulation is defmed by 
y =(concentration, percentage change in employment, percentage change in 
market share, tariff rate) 
Both the industries and regulators are faced with binary decisions. The supply and demand 
variables above are used as the independent variables to explain regulator and industry 
behavior respectively. The nested logit model, then, is used to estimate the parameters j3, a , 
and cr. 
VA 
29. In the limit, as <J goes to 1, e ' + 
See Appendix F for the proof. 
[e 1- cr + 
v ] 1-cr A, 
1-cr e 
30. Note that the variables for unionization and petitioner type were necessarily excluded from the nested logit model 
because the data are peculiar only to industries that have actually applied for protection, which means that an inclusive 




Table 2 below contains the results of the straight supply side estimations where the 
binary logit model, discussed earlier, is applied to the data on lTC decisions. The choice vari-
able in Table 2 is the ITC's decision (1 for positive, 0 for negative) on whether or not to grant 
protection to a petitioning industry. 
Table 2 
LOG IT ESTIMATIONS OF THE DETERMINANTS OF lTC DECISIONS 














Elasticity of Demand -0.46 
Industry Concentration Ratios -3.12 
Administration petition -0.67 
Single firm petition -0.88 
Unionization -0.23 
Industry Employment 3.21 
Change Industry Employment -0.69 
Change in Market Share 6.01 
Capacity Utilization -6.04 
Tariff Rate 9.96 
U.S. Trade Deficit 9.64 
percent correctly predicted = 68 















** signifies a 5% significance level or better. 
The results indicate some degree of support for the pressure group model discussed in Chapter 
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3. The size of the industry measured by the employment variable indicates that larger indus-
tries are more likely to get protection than smaller ones. This lends support to the hypothesis 
that size matters and that larger industries are better able to secure desired regulatory action, 
perhaps because of their greater political power relative to smaller industries. Further, the sin-
gle petitioner variable indicates that there may be power in numbers; a single firm may be less 
likely to succeed in pressuring for protection than a group of firms that petition together. 
These comprise hypotheses H2 and H5 respectfully. The employment and the single petitioner 
variables are both significant at the 2% level. 
Hypothesis HI, that industries whose goods have a more inelastic demand are more 
likely to get protection because of Jess deadweight loss, is not supported. The elasticity vari-
able, a proxy for efficient policies, is insignificant, but has the opposite sign from that predicted 
by Becker's pressure group model; the negative sign on the elasticity coefficient indicates that 
of those industries that applied for protection in this period, those producing more inelastically 
demanded goods were less likely to get protection than industries producing goods with a more 
elastic demand. Thus, the notion that regulators make decisions based on the efficiency of their 
policy choices is not supported by this supply-side analysis. 
Concentration and unionization, which are proxies for industries' costs of organization, 
should be good measures of an industry's ability to pressure for political outcomes. Recall 
hypotheses H3 and H4 which implied that the greater an interest groups' organization and the 
lower the costs of that organization, the greater its political power or influence should be; but 
both of these variables are insignificant in predicting lTC decisions. Though pressure group 
theory suggests that the more concentrated an interest group is, the better it should be at pres-
suring policy makers, an alternative hypothesis to consider is that a high degree of concentra-
tion in production is not as important in terms of political influence on trade as some other 
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factors like geographic concentration. Concentration ratios measure the percentage of output 
by the four largest finns in an industry. Though higher concentration may indicate greater 
organization in an industry, it may be that more political power is generated when an industry 
controls a number of states and congressional districts than when it is concentrated in a small 
number of firms and a single location. For example, it may be that the lumber industry, which 
has a very low concentration ratio, but is geographically concentrated and especially strong 
across the Pacific Northwest, will have as much political power in getting trade protection as a 
highly concentrated one such as the motor vehicle industry. So low concentration combined 
with geographic political strength may be as important as production concentration in terms of 
political power for industries seeking protection from foreign imports. 
Besides these five variables, which correspond to the five hypotheses presented in 
Chapter 3, other variables were also included in the analysis to capture indicators of economic 
hardship and need for regulation. The variable measuring percent change in employment in the 
industries has the predicted sign, but is insignificant. Decreasing employment should be an 
indicator of a need for protection in an industry; but the percentage change in employment by 
industry appears to have little or no effect on lTC decisions. 
Another indicator of a need for protection is the percentage change in an industry's 
share of the domestic market. The larger an industry's increase in domestic market share, the 
less of a threat that is posed by foreign imports, thus the lower should be its need (or desire) for 
protection. However, the results in Table 2 indicate that the larger an industry's increase in 
market share, the more likely the lTC is to grant it protection. But the t-statistic is 
insignificant. 
The yearly U.S. trade deficit was used to capture national economic trends that would 
affect an industry's likelihood of getting protection. This variable, significant at the 90% level, 
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indicates that industries are more likely to get protection the greater the trade deficit is in the 
u.s. 
Finally, additional industry-specific indicators of economic need for protection were 
included in the analysis; these are capacity utilization and existing tariff rates. The capacity 
utilization of an industry, which is a measure of the percentage of plant capacity that is being 
used in production, was included as an indicator of how well an industry is performing. A low 
capacity indicates large amounts of idle resources, hence lower production in the industry. The 
results in Table 2 indicate that industries with a lower capacity are more likely to get protec-
tion, but the statistic is insignificant. Though capacity is low in some industries that suffer 
from foreign competition, it is also the case that industries such as space vehicles and equip-
ment, tanks, small arms and ammunition, and gasoline pumps, which all face relatively little 
competition from foreign imports, are among the industries with the lowest capacity utilization 
figures . Thus, the fact that some industries with low capacity face relatively little foreign com-
petition may be the reason for the insignificance of this variable. So capacity appears not be an 
accurate measure of an industry's need (or desire) for protection. 
Whether or not industries already have high tariffs also does not appear to explain lTC 
decisions. Though the variable for tariff rates is positively correlated with an applicant's likeli-
hood of being granted protection, it is insignificant. However, since a wide range of tariff rates 
exist in the U.S., there is no reason to believe that the lTC has some sense of an "ideal" rate; 
thus, existing rates presumably should have little or no effect on lTC decisions. 
Neither capacity utilization, percentage change in employment, percentage change in 
market share, nor existing tariff rates appear to be good measures of lTC behavior. None of 
these measures of economic hardship are significant predictors of lTC decision-making. Meas-
ures of political power or influence, namely size and petitioner type, seem to be the only 
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industry specific characteristics in this model that affect whether or not an industry will get 
protection from the lTC. 
Demand Model 
On the demand side, Table 3 contains the results of applying a logit model to data 
comprising industries' decisions of whether or not to apply for protection. The binary choice 
variable is the industry's decision (1 for positive, 0 for negative). The results indicate that 
industries that already have higher tariffs, and ones that increase their market shares and 
employment, are all less likely to apply. 
Table 3 
LOGITESTIMATIONS OF THE DETERMINANTS OF INDUSTRY DECISIONS 














Industry Concentration Ratios 
Percentage Change in Industry Employment 
Percentage Change in Market Share 
















Concentration again has the opposite sign than initially expected, if one believes that 
concentration implies organization and political power. Industries with lower concentration 
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ratios are more likely to apply than those more highly concentrated. As discussed earlier, con-
centration may not be a good measure of political strength. 
Both the employment and tariff variables are significant with the percentage change 
employment significant at the 2% level and the measure of tariffs significant at the 1% level. 
This seems to indicate that industries do apply for protection when they are at an economic 
disadvantage and are doing poorly. 
In summary, the demand and supply estimations indicate that industries with lower 
existing tariffs and decreasing employment are more likely to apply for protection via the lTC, 
while larger industries that apply as a group are more likely to be granted a favorable ruling by 
the lTC. However, by estimating the supply and demand equations separately, the potential 
problem of self-selectivity is ignored. It may be the case that those industries that actually 
apply to the lTC are a select group of all industries and that they, in general, are likely to 
benefit more from applying than a randomly selected set of industries. Therefore, it is impor-
tant to account for any selectivity bias in the estimations and analysis. 
Nested Supply and Demand Model 
For the final analysis, a nested logit model is used to estimate the supply of and 
demand for trade regulation; the estimated coefficients of the lTC choice model are used to cal-
culate an inclusive value, vector INCV, for all industries. As mentioned earlier, in order to 
create an inclusive value for all industries, it was necessary to exclude the variables for unioni-
zation and petitioner type which are peculiar only to industries that file a petition. This vector 
is then included as an independent variable in the estimation of the likelihood of an industry 
applying to the lTC for protection. 
Along with the inclusive value, all of the previous variables that are believed to affect 
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Table 4 
NESTED LOGIT MODEL 
Logit Estimations of the Determinants of ITC Decisions 
















Elasticity of Demand 
Industry Concentration Ratios 
Industry Employment 
Percentage Change in Industry Employment 
Percentage Change in Market Share 
Capacity Utilization 
Tariff Rate 






















Log it Estimation of the Determinants of Industry Decisions 

















Industry Concentration Ratios -3.80 
Percentage Change in Industry Employment 

















an industry's decision to apply for trade relief are included in the logit estimations. The results 
of the nested logit model appear in Table 4. The table shows again that the supply of trade 
regulation by the lTC appears to be best predicted by industry size and national economic 
trends rather than economic need or efficient policy choice. In the second stage, a drop in 
employment and lower relative tariff rates seem to be the best explanatory variables for when 
an industry will apply for regulation. Finally, the low coefficient on the inclusive value vari-
able indicates that industries do self-select themselves in deciding to file applications for pro-
tection. That is, it is likely that industries base their decisions to apply on their perception of 
the maximum expected utility of being granted protection by the lTC. 
The null hypothesis that the coefficient of the inclusive value, 1- cr , equals 1 is 
rejected at the 5% significance level, while the alternative hypothesis that 1-cr equals 0 is 
accepted. Thus it is likely that some unobserved effect that makes industries successful in peti-
tioning for protection, is correlated with the unobserved components that lead an industry to 
apply for regulation in the first place. It is this possibility of correlation between the unob-
served characteristics that leads to a violation of the assumption of the independence of 
irrelevant alternatives (IIA), which makes the three alternative multinomial logit model inap-
propriate. For this reason, we shall consider the nested logit model a more valid representation 
of the observed phenomena. 
Chamberlain (1980) discusses the possibility of an omitted variable bias due to a 
failure of controlling for group specific effects. That is, variables that are constant within a 
group are omitted from the regression. If variables that capture group differences are omitted 
and if these variables are correlated with other independent variables in the regression, then the 
regression function will, in general, not identify the coefficients. In both the industry decision 
stage and the lTC decision stage of the nested logit model used here, there is the potential 
95 
problem of an omitted variable bias which could be corrected by applying the Chamberlain 
methods. 
Hausman and McFadden (1984) provide a means of testing if the nested logit model is 
the correct specification or whether the outcomes obey the property of independence of 
irrelevent alternatives (IIA). The purpose of the specification test is to determine if the proba-
bility of an industry getting protection from the lTC is the same whether or not the factors that 
led the industry to apply in the first place are considered in the model. In other words we want 
to test whether the coefficients on the explanatory variables affecting the outcome that indus-
tries apply and get protection (outcome A2 ) are the same for the unconditional and the condi-
tiona! choice models. 
Recall that V,; is defined as the utility of outcomes A 1, A 2, or A 3 where 
Vri = W(r li) + W(i) and W(i) depends only on the industry choice, while W(r li) depends on 
the lTC choice given that the industry applies. Under the conditional probability model, 
VA = W (Not Apply) = - o.'y 
I 
VA = W (Positive I Apply)+ W (Apply) = (1 - cr)WX 
1 
VA = W (Negative I Apply) + W (Apply) = 0, 
' 
where outcome A 1 depends only on the explanatory variables that affect the industry decision 
(y's), while outcome A2 depends on explanatory variables that affect both the industry decision 
and the lTC decision (both y' s and X's). 31 
For the multinomial logit model with three alternatives, the decision to apply itself 
does not independently add any additional utility to the final strict utilities ( Vri ) of any out-
31. Note that the utilities are normalized such that VA, = 0. That is, W (Apply)= 0 and W (Negative I Apply)= 0. 
come. So the utilities have the forms: 
VA, = W (Not Apply) = - o.'y 
VA, = W (Positive I Apply) = (1- cr)WX 
VA = W (Negative I Apply) = 0 . 32 , 
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The purpose of the Hausman test is to determine whether the coefficients (the j3's ) from the 
conditional choice model given two alternatives, A2 and A3, are the same as the corresponding 
coefficients from the three alternative multinomial logit model (MNL). Under the uncondi-
tional multinomiallogit structure, the probabilities have the form : 
Alternatively, conditioning on an industry's decision of whether or not to apply, the probabili-
ties of getting protection or getting turned down (i.e. a positive or negative decision by the 
lTC) under the nested logit structure are given by 
P(A~ = 1 
1 + e-!3'X 
P(A 3) = 
e-!3'X 
+ e-!3'X . 
The null hypothesis is that the coefficients of the independent variables that explain the 
agency's decision (the p 's) are the same under both model specifications. That is 
32. Again the utilities are normalized such that VA = 0. , 
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1/0 : ~MNL = ~NesruJLogit. Acceptance of /-10 would imply that industry decisions do not affect the 
final outcomes. This would mean, for example, that the unconditional probability of a positive 
lTC ruling (MNL) is equivalent to the conditional probability of a positive decision (Nested 
Logit). Hausman and McFadden show that if the IIA property holds, then 
plim (~MNL - ~Nuted Log it) = 0. The standard test statistic developed by Hausman is given by 
IV-+ -
the covariance matrix for the unconditional multinomiallogit model and Cov(~NemdLogit) is the 
covariance matrix for the conditional model of lTC choice. The statistic T is distributed x?-
where r is the rank of the covariance matrices. 
Table 5 shows the results under the multinomial logit model. The coefficients of the 
X's are compared with the coefficients from the conditional model given in Table 4. Using the 
Hausman test, T = 101.228 which is distributed xl. The probability of this occuring for the 
given data is less than .005. Therefore, /-1
0 
is rejected at the 1% level. ll follows that the model 
based on the multinomiallogit structure is not correctly specified, thus the nested logit model 
is accepted as the more valid representation of the observed data. 
Finally, the issue of labor intensity was addressed by including the ratio of employ-
ment over value of shipments in the model. In Table 6, labor intensity is added as an explana-
tory variable under democratic versus republican leadership in the White House. Neither the 
supply nor the demand for protection appear to be significantly related to labor intensity, even 
when the democrats control the White House. This result supports the findings of Basevi 
(1966) and Cheh (1976), over earlier results, that labor intensive industries are not more likely 
to be protected than capital intensive ones. 
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Table 5 
MULTINOMIAL LOG IT MODEL 
Logit Estimations of the Three Alternative Choice Model 













total number of observations 2880 
Independent 
Variable 
Independent Variables (X' s) Affecting lTC Decisions: 
Constant 
Elasticity of Demand 
Industry Concentration Ratios 
Industry Employment 
Percentage Change in Industry Employment 
Percentage Change in Market Share 
Capacity Utilization 
Tariff Rate 
U.S. Trade Deficit 
Independent Variables (y' s) Affecting Apply Decisions: 
Constant 
Concentration Ratios 
Percentage Change in Industry Employment 
Percentage Change in Market Share 
Tariff Rate 
percent correctly predicted = 92.88 
*signifies a 10 % significance level. 




































NESTED LOG IT MODEL (including labor intensity as a function of presidential party) 
Logit Estimations of the Determinants of lTC Decisions 
















Elasticity of Demand 
Industry Concentration Ratios 
Industry Employment 
Percentage Change in Industry Employment 
Percentage Change in Market Share 
Capacity Utilization 
Tariff Rate 
U.S. Trade Deficit 
Labor Intensity-Under Democrats 


























Logit Estimation of the Determinants of Industry Decisions 














Industry Concentration Ratios -3.48 
Percentage Change in Industry Employment -1 .09 
Percentage Change in Market Share -0.59 
Tariff Rate -1 .20 
Labor Intensity-Under Democrat -6.03 
Labor Intensity-Under Republican 4.42 
Inclusive Value 0.12 













The estimation results above demonstrate the importance not only of considering both 
the supply of and demand for regulation but also of accounting for the problem of self-
selection among the industries. The results show that we cannot reject the hypothesis that 
industries may be aware of certain aspects of the regulatory commission's behavior when mak-
ing their decisions and that they may use this information in a utility maximizing fashion. 
Thus, we adopt the nested logit model to account for the behavior of industries in choosing 
whether or not to file an application with the lTC. 
Because of this problem of sample selection, much of the scholarly work done on 
predicting either the demand for or supply of protection may be biased. For example, Gold-
stein and Takacs each look at the supply of regulation by the lTC and claim, from their ana-
lyses, that protectionist pressures do not affect government policies. What each of these stu-
dies fails to account for is that the group of petitioners may have common unobservable 
characteristics that lead them to apply in the first place. For Goldstein, the fact that the accep-
tance rate of petitions has not changed over time may merely mean that the characteristics of 
the pool of applicants has not changed, not that policy makers have been unaffected by protec-
tionist pressures. And, Takacs' claim that the government does not respond to protectionist 
pressures may be the result of inaccurate predictions about the demand for protection, or the 
factors that drive industries to file petitions. Both models can be improved upon to predict 
more accurately the effect of protectionist pressures on policy outcomes. On a more micro-
level, the results in Table 2 above indicate that pressure groups may indeed affect outcomes; 
both size (measured by employment) and the type of petitioner (single firms or groups of firms) 
seem to be good predictors of lTC behavior. 
101 
Furthermore, by far a vast majority of the literature, both on trade regulation in general 
and on the lTC in particular, focuses only of one side of the problem. Many factors have been 
identified to explain the supply of and demand for protection, but by isolating and examining 
only one side of the problem at a time, many seemingly false or contestable conslusions have 
been drawn by the authors. A common thread in all of the lTC specific studies on trade regula-
tion is that the agency is not affected by and does not respond to political pressures. This work 
challenges that result by clearly demonstrating the importance of the problem of self-selection. 
Finally, recall that the theoretical groundwork for this study is Becker's pressure group 
model of regulation. The major theme of the Becker model is that regulators behave efficiently 
by choosing the most efficient outcomes; that is, they grant regulation which provides a given 
benefit to a subsidized group with the least deadweight loss to society. This notion of efficient 
policy choice drives the whole regulatory system in Becker's work. 
The results presented above, however, may lead one to question the foundation of 
Becker's model. The analysis shows that one very important regulatory agency, the lTC, may 
not choose policies with the least deadweight loss to society. Indeed, we cannot reject the 
hypothesis that they grant protection to industries when the deadweight loss is higher than it 
would be from protecting those that are turned away. This result should cast doubts on the 
notion that regulators do not favor the desires of pressure groups over what is better for society 
as a whole. 
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CONCLUSION 
The purpose of this work has been to explain the varying levels of protection across 
industries by focusing on factors that affect both the supply of and demand for the regulation of 
trade. Both circumstances that lead industries to request protection, and factors that affect the 
government's decision of whether or not to supply that protection have been examined. Indus-
tries and the government presumably have incentives to pursue utility-maximizing courses of 
action. On the demand side, when an industry seeks a higher tariff, the benefits from that tariff 
presumably outweigh the costs of applying and lobbying for protection. On the supply side, 
when the government chooses to protect an industry, the political benefits in terms of, for 
example, votes or contributions presumably exceed the costs in terms of the lost support from 
those harmed by the policy. A major problem of the literature on both the International Trade 
Commission and the regulation of trade in general has been a failure of scholars to account for 
both the supply and the demand sides of the regulatory issue. In other words, what factors best 
explain the actions of interest groups and the decisions of regulators? This study tests for the 
potential problem of industries self-selecting themselves when seeking regulation, or making 
their decisions by taking into account what they perceive the ITC's decision will be. 
The problem of self-selection is dealt with by modeling lTC outcomes with a nested 
structure (the nested logit model) where the final outcome depends on both industry choice and 
agency choice. The industries (demanders) face the binary choice of whether or not to undergo 
the costs of applying and pressuring the regulators for trade protection. The International 
Trade Commission (the supplier) makes the binary decision of whether or not to grant regula-
tory benefits to each of the applicants based on industry characteristics and political factors. 
This work demonstrates that self-selection is a problem in predicting the probability of an 
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industry getting protection; that is, industries do appear to self-select themselves when decid-
ing whether or not to apply for protective tariffs. 
By comparing the utility of not applying with the maximum expected utility that can 
be derived from filing an application, an industry can make a rational decision as to the useful-
ness of its seeking protection from the lTC. By observing ITC behavior, an industry acquires 
some information about the value of its filing an application. This implies that those indus-
tries that believe their requests will probably be rejected will not bother to apply, since their 
expected utility from applying will be lower than the utility that they derive from not applying. 
Thus the applicant pool is not a random sample of industries. The probability that lTC out-
comes are independent of industry choice (the property of independence of irrelevent alterna-
tives or IIA) is rejected at the 1% level under the Hausman-McFadden specification test for 
multinomial logit. The nested logit structure is thus accepted as a representation of the 
observed phenomena more valid than previous models. 
Self-selection by the industries demonstrates the potential problems with the existing 
literature on regulation by the International Trade Commission. Scholars, failing to account for 
the selectivity problem in modeling the agency's decisions, have drawn false or misleading 
conclusions about the behavior of the lTC and about the factors that influence lTC choices. 
Contrary to the conclusions of many ITC-specific studies on the regulation of trade, the 
analysis presented here indicates that pressure groups do have some influence on the decisions 
of policy makers. This study also shows that regulators may respond positively to the interests 
of pressure groups even when their policy choices are not efficient in terms of the deadweight 
loss to society. These findings lead to new avenues for future research into the questions of 
how interest groups might influence regulators and what effects their pressuring might have on 
policy outcomes. 
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Both the type of petitioner and the size of industries appear to be good predictors of 
lTC behavior, but none of the many industry-specific variables that measure an economic need 
for regulation seem to explain the agency's actions. We need to look deeper into the politics of 
regulation by the lTC in order to better understand what drives an industry to apply for protec-
tion and what determines whether or not an industry will be granted protection. Because the 
lTC is an agency created and both funded and reauthorized annually by Congress, this should 
necessarily entail a look at Congress and its possible influence on the behavior of the Interna-
tional Trade Commission. 
A well-known body of literature exists that incorporates institutions, particularly 
Congress, into the study of regulation. See for example, the works of Shepsle and Weingast 
(1984) or Weingast and Moran (1983). Though their theory of "Congressional Dominance," as 
it is called, has not previously been given attention in this work, it is important to discuss its 
significance here. Typically in these studies, the influence of Congress on agency decisions 
has been measured by such things as the liberal-conservative voting scores of Congressmen 
constructed by Americans for Democratic Action (ADA scores), the ADA ratings of the 
relevant committee(s) and its chairman, or the political party make-up of the committee(s) that 
oversees the agency. (In this area, it is the Ways and Means Committee, in particular the Trade 
Subcommittee, which has jurisdiction over trade matters.) Also, the party of the President has 
been used to account for presidential influence over policy outcomes of agencies. 
This type of analysis, however, presents problems in this work for two important rea-
sons. First, because of the nature of trade legislation, it is difficult, if not impossible, to deter-
mine how a given member of Congress or the President stands on the issue of granting protec-
tion merely by considering his political party affiliation or ADA rating. Though generaliza-
tions have been made, neither party identification nor liberal-conservative measures of voting 
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behavior seem to accurately predict whether or not protection or free trade will be the preferred 
outcome. Historically, because they face a national constituency, both Democratic and Repub-
lican Presidents have favored, or at least purported to favor, free trade. Furthermore, Congress-
men of both parties or political leanings have been on both sides of the protection-free trade 
issue. For example, in 1982, the Carribbean Basin Initiative Bill (HR 7397) came before the 
floor of the House of Representatives for a vote. Several amendments were allowed under the 
rule including one by Democrat Richard Gephart to protect tuna and one by Republican Larry 
Hopkins to protect tobacco.33 Though these amendments can be interpreted as mere position-
taking stances on the part of these Congressmen for the sake of satisfying constituent requests 
or demands, instances of such behavior abound. Thus one might question whether other fac-
tors besides party afiliation might not be better indicators of where members of Congress stand 
on trade issues. The difficulty of determining how congressmen stand on the issue of protec-
tionism by their party identification is even more pronounced if one looks at congressional 
behavior over time. Republicans were historically more protectionist than Democrats, but fac-
tors such as the pressures of rising unemployment have blurred this distinction. In fact, it 
appears that Democrats take a protectionist stance more often than Republicans today. 
Secondly, because many changes have been made in the legislation governing the lTC 
since its creation, it is very difficult to undertake a time series study that allows for variation in 
the make-up of relevant congressional committees and changes in committee chairmen or 
presidents. The rules under which the lTC operates have been fairly stable since 1974 which is 
why the period from 1975 to 1984 was chosen for this study. In this period, however, the 
Ways and Means Committee membership underwent relatively little change. By party 
33. Congressional Quarterly Almanac. (CQ inc. Washington D.C., 1982), pp. 151 -56. 
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identification, the membership has only varied by a few percentage points from one year to the 
next--the percentage of Democrats on the committee had a range of only 65% to 67% over the 
ten year time period covered in this study. Also, the chairmanship was fairly stable, changing 
only once in the ten year period; the change occurred in 1981 when chairmanship switched 
from Democrat AI Ullman to Democrat Dan Rostenkowski. Because of this stability, it is 
difficult to draw conclusions about what effects, if any, party identification might have on trade 
policy outcomes. But at the same time, extending the time period of the study would not solve 
the problem of member stability because from 1962 to 1974 more stringent requirements for 
granting protection were governing the lTC. This different set of rules is probably responsible 
for severely restricting the number of applications that were received by the Commission in the 
1960s and early 1970s. Under a different set of rules, a different set of criteria may have been 
used by industries in deciding whether or not to file an application. Thus, pooling data from 
after 1974 with data prior to that year would likely lead to biased conclusions. 
Because of the difficulties of dividing Democrats and Republicans (or liberals and con-
servatives) on the issue of protection versus free trade, and because of the problems that 
emerge in studying lTC behavior over longer time periods, the traditional means of measuring 
Congressional or Presidential influence could not be effectively used in this work. Alterna-
tively, incorporating political institutions into a study of the lTC requires a new or different 
focus and means of accounting for a possible relationship between Congress or the President 
and the behavior of the regulators on the Trade Commission. 
On the surface, it is evident that both Congress and the President can influence the lTC 
and do. Congress changes the rules under which the lTC operates and the President can 
modify a decision made by the lTC. Focusing in particular on congressional influence, it is 
apparent that changes in the rules have had a great effect on how many petitions have been 
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filed and perhaps also on which industries have filed petitions. If, as evidence suggests, indus-
tries do base their decisions to apply (or not) on their perception of the behavior of the lTC, 
then the rules and changes in those rules will surely affect the final outcomes. 
But besides just changing the rules or modifying the results, there may be other ways 
in which Congress or the President may influence the final decisions of the Commission. One 
possibility not covered in this work, nor explored in the literature, is to look more closely at the 
location of industries in relation to congressional power. For example, industries which are 
concentrated in districts whose congressmen have more political power or influence may apply 
more often to the lTC, and may be more likely to be granted protection by this regulatory 
agency. By looking at geographic concentration and location of industries, as well as other 
region-specific factors like unemployment, union activity, or industrial shipments perhaps we 
can better predict whether or not an industry will apply for protection and whether or not the 
lTC will respond favorably to its demands. My future research will examine the relationship 
of Congress and the President to the International Trade Commission and what effect, if any, 
they have on decisions that are made by the lTC. By looking at these alternative avenues of 
influence, perhaps we can better understand the role of political institutions in the regulation of 
trade by the United States. 
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APPENDIX A 
Key Trade Legislation 
1789 Tariff Act: first tariff act. 
1909 Payne-Aldrich Tariff Act: maximum-minimum clause introduced. 
1913 Underwood Tariff Act: maximum-minimum clause cancelled; major downward revision 
of tariff rates; first income tax law imposed. 
1916 U.S. Tariff Commission created. 
1922 Fordney-McCumber Tariff Act: Reinstated higher tariffs of 1909 level; flexible tariff 
provision enacted giving President power to revise tariff rates up or down by 50% fol-
lowing a Tariff Commission investigation; gave Tariff Commission the duty to investi-
gate the following: flexible tariff cases (under section 313), cost of production cases 
(section 315), unfair practices cases (section 316), and discrimination cases (section 
317). 
1930 Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act: Congress enacted highest tariff rates in U.S. history. 
1934 Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act: authorized the President to negotiate reciprocal trade 
agreements to reduce Smoot-Hawley rates by up to 50% without requiring prior Tariff 
Commission investigations. 
1937-45 Reciprocal Trade Agreement Act was renewed with same basic structure. 
1945 Trade Agreements Expansion Act replaces Reciprocal Trade Agreement Act and allows 
additional 50% reductions in tariff rates from existing levels. 
1947 GATT created; escape clause provision agreed to by negotiating countries that signed 
GATT. 
1948-62 Trade Agreements Extension Act renewed. 
1948 Tariff Commission authorized to conduct Peril Point Investigations. 
1949 Peril Point repealed. Reinstated in 1951 and continued until 1962. 
1951 Tariff Commission ordered by Congress to investigate escape clause cases. 
1955 Tariff Commission given duty to investigate Antidumping cases. 
1962 Trade Expansion Act: Peril Point repealed; Additional 50% reductions in tariff duties 
allowed under Presidential negotiation; Adjustment Assistance investigations begun by 
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Tariff Commission under section 301 of Trade Act. 
1974 Trade Act: Tariff Commission renamed lTC; Countervailing Duty Investigations begun 
by the lTC; Adjustment Assistance Investigations turned over to Departments of Com-
merce and Labor. 
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APPENDIXB 
Derivation of Domestic Elasticities of Demand 
Coumot aggregation is defmed by Deaton and Muellbauer (1980) as a restriction on 
the derivative of the demand function. Given a demand function, qi = Ci (x, p) where i denotes 
the set of goods, i = 1 to n, with prices p 1 to p,., and income x then the budget constraint 
implies that 
Differentiating this constraint on the functions gi with respect to Pi gives 
It can be shown that this is equivalent to Lk wk eki + wi = 0 where budget shares, wi are defined 
by wi = PiqJx and eki is the cross-price elasticity of demand defined by 






Therefore, Lie Pic a + qi = 0. 
Pi 
Now assume that only two goods exist, the imported good JG and the domestic good 
DC, where total demand is the sum of import and domestic demands and the budget shares for 
these goods satisfy w1G + w0 G = 1. Using Lie w~c eici + w; = 0, then the following is true fork = IC 
and i =DC: 
Solving for the own price elasticity of domestic demand, eDGDG gives 
where ww is the import share, and e1GoG = eDGIG is the cross price elasticity of DG and IC . So 
given the cross price elasticities and the import shares for the industries estimated by Shiells, et 
al. (1985) the domestic elasticities of demand can be easily calculated. 
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APPENDIXC 
List of Variables 
Variable Name Description 
lTC Decision Dummy for lTC decision whether or not to grant protection 
Apply Decision Dummy for industry decision whether or not to apply for protection 
Concentration Ratio Percent of production accounted for by the four largest firms 
measured by industry at four digit SIC level 
Capacity Utilization Plant capacity utilization measured at four digit SIC level 
Elasticity Elasticity of Demand measured by industry at three digit SIC level 
Trade Deficit Yearly measure of the U.S. Trade Deficit 
%~GNP Yearly measure of the change in U.S. GNP 
Union Dummy for union involvement in a petition to the lTC for import relief 
Administration Dummy for an administration initiated or backed petition 
Multiple Petitioner Dummy for a petition by a group of firms 
Single Petitioner Dummy for a petition by a single firm 
Tariff Tariff Rate by industry measured at three digit SIC level 
Employment Number of employees by industry measured at four digit SIC level 
Non-Tariff Dummy for industries with non-tariff barriers to trade 
Market Share Share of the domestic market held by U.S. industries 
Exports Value of Exports by industry measured at four digit SIC level 
Imports Value of Imports by industry measured at four digit SIC level 
Shipments Value of Shipments by industry measured at four digit SIC level 







I mpor ts(t )-/ mpor ts(l - 1) 
Imports(t-1) 
Employmenl(l )-Employment(l 1) 
Employmenl(t - 1) 




log(exp(frX) + 1) 
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APPENDIXD 
Descriptive Statistics of the Variables 
Table 7 
VARIABLE STATISTICS FOR ALL INDUSTRIES--2903 CASES 
Variable Mean Minimum Maximum Standard 
Deviation 
EJAS' -1.11 -3.86 0.08 0.45 
CONS 40.79 4.0 100.0 21.03 
CAP 70.37 20.0 100.0 1287 
EMP 45.49 1.30 528.3 66.18 
PRCHGEMP -0.007 -0.47 7.74 0.18 
PRCHGMKT -0.008 -4.39 8.36 0.22 
TARIFF 36.05 0.0 114.5 16.51 
Table 8 
VARIABLE STATISTICS FOR APPLICANTS--202 CASES 
Variable Mean Minimum Maximum Standard 
Deviation 
£lAS -1.18 -2.88 0.08 0.52 
CONS 39.33 7.0 98.0 2269 
CAP 68.91 29.0 97.0 11.72 
EMP 88.09 1.30 505.4 1222 
PRCHGEMP -0.023 -0.31 0.47 0.098 
PRCHGMTCT -0.012 -1.54 0.24 0.12 
TARIFF 33.32 6.7 66.41 14.17 
TRDEF 36.25 -9.2 110.93 3214 
*The variable names for the abbreviations are as follows: EU.Se elasticity, CONh concentration, CliP= capacity 
utilization, EMP= employment, TRDEF E trade deficit, TARIFF a tariff rate, PRCIIGEMPd>!J. employment, and PRCJJGMKT•lfo!J. 
domestic market share. 
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Table 9 









APPLY ELAS CONS CAP EMP PRCHGEMP PRCHGMKT 
1.00 -0.048 -0.017 -0.029 0.174 -0.024 -0.005 
1.00 -0.023 0.011 -0.003 -0.079 0.001 
1.00 0.009 -0.145 -0.031 0.004 
1.00 0.07 0.106 -0.02 
























1.00 -0.108 -0.083 
1.00 -0.068 
1.00 
-0.056 0.156 -0.016 
-0.084 0.069 -0.104 
0.080 -0.202 -0.053 
1.00 -0.015 0.182 
1.00 0.016 
1.00 
0.095 0.110 0.146 
-0.111 -0.095 -0.002 
-0.049 -0.109 -0.055 
-0.012 -0.030 -0.081 
0.017 0.123 -0.010 
0.011 0.076 0.079 





Computations of the Probabilities for the Nested Logit Model 
The strict utilities of the three possible outcomes specified by Diagram 5 are defined 
by: 
VA, = logY 1 = -o.'y 
VA = logY 2 = (1-cr)P'X 
l 
VA, = logY 3 = 0. 
Furthermore, we know that conditional on choosing one of the alternatives A 2 and A 3, the pro-
bability of an industry getting protection has the binomiallogit form: 
1 
y2""f=cr 










e I-a + 1 
1 
The probability of applying is given by 
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Substitutions similar to those above lead to: 




1 + e-la'y + (1-a)INCV] 
where the inclusive value is defined as INCV = log[ e~x + 1] . 
Finally, the unconditional probability of outcome A 2 can be rewritten as: 
e~'X e<1-a)INCV 
eWX + 1 e-<~.'y +e(1-a)INCV 
1 1 
1 + e-P'X 1 + e-la'y + (1-a)/NCV] 
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APPENDIXF 
Proof of Footnote 29 
We need to show that in the limit, as a goes to 1, 
[ 
VA VA ] 
~ ---· ---· 




evA, + lim [e ~ + e -?] z 
z~O 





[ e ~ [ 1 + e fe ~x]] '= 





[e;[e~e7 + 1]]' 
ex · lim 
z~O 





1 + e z 
[ 
~ ] z 
e z + 1 = eY. 
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